

The epistemic marking system of émigré Dokpa Tibetan

Nancy J. Caplow
University of California at Santa Barbara
nancap@umail.ucsb.edu

September 12, 2000

Abstract.....	1
1. Introduction.....	2
2. Dokpa Tibetan.....	3
3. Dokpa morphosyntax.....	6
3.1 General background.....	6
3.2 Clause structure.....	6
4. Epistemics and evidentials.....	9
4.1 Definitions.....	9
4.2 Epistemics and evidentials in Dokpa.....	13
5. Markers of certainty – the “basic” pattern.....	17
5.1 Perceptual evidentials.....	19
5.1.1 <i>duk</i> (CURRENT PERCEPTION).....	20
5.1.1.1 <i>duk</i> as an ELPA linking verb.....	20
5.1.1.2 <i>duk</i> as an auxiliary verb.....	21
5.1.2 <i>soŋ</i> (PAST PERCEPTION).....	24
5.2 Personal evidentials.....	25
5.2.1 <i>yöʔ</i> (PERSONAL FACT).....	26
5.2.1.1 <i>yöʔ</i> as an ELPA linking verb.....	27
5.2.1.2 <i>yöʔ</i> as an auxiliary verb.....	28
5.2.2 <i>yin</i> (CONSCIOUS PERSONAL FACT).....	29
5.2.2.1 <i>yin</i> as a COP linking verb.....	30
5.2.2.2 <i>yin</i> as an auxiliary verb.....	31

5.2.3	Contrasting <i>yin</i> and <i>yöʔ</i>	32
5.2.3.1	As linking verbs.....	33
5.2.3.2	As auxiliary verbs.....	35
5.2.4	<i>tSuŋ</i> ("HAPPENED to ME").....	36
5.3	Non-evidentials.....	39
5.3.1	<i>reʔ</i> (GENERIC FACT)	40
5.3.1.1	<i>reʔ</i> as a linking verb.....	41
5.3.1.2	<i>reʔ</i> as an auxiliary verb.....	42
5.3.2	<i>yö reʔ</i> (SPEAKER KNOWLEDGE)	44
5.3.2.1	<i>yö reʔ</i> as an ELPA linking verb.....	45
5.3.2.2	<i>yö reʔ</i> as an auxiliary verb.....	47
5.4	Reported information.....	48
6.	Manipulation of the basic pattern	50
6.1	Creating an effect of intimacy.....	51
6.2	Creating an effect of distance.....	54
6.3	Similar systems in other dialects and languages.....	57
7.	Markers of inference	59
7.1	The basis of inference.....	60
7.2	Synactic distribution.....	64
7.3	The locus of inference.....	67
7.4	Other pragmatic parameters.....	68
7.5	Lhasa Tibetan <i>zhag</i>	69
7.6	Inference in other dialects and languages	72
8.	Other non-certainty markers	73
8.1	Markers of guessing	74
8.2	"I think..."	77
9.	Conclusions.....	77
	References.....	79

The epistemic marking system of émigré Dokpa Tibetan

Nancy J. Caplow
University of California at Santa Barbara
nancap@umail.ucsb.edu

September 12, 2000

ABSTRACT

In this paper I present an overview of the epistemic marking system of Dokpa Tibetan. This study includes not only the morphologically simple markers of certainty, but also the morphologically complex markers of inference, possibility, and probability. The patterns of use of the simple epistemics in Dokpa are similar to those described for “evidentials” in other dialects of Tibetan. The speaker’s selection of an epistemic marker is a function of the speaker’s source of information, degree of certainty regarding the truth of the proposition, and degree of “engagement” – i.e., whether s/he takes an intimate or remote view of the action, event, or state presented in the clause.

Cognates of the morphologically complex epistemics in other dialects of Tibetan have received less attention in the literature. I focus here particularly on Dokpa’s markers of inference, which are interesting in several respects. First, they are unusual in their morphological complexity. Second, they are semantically specific. That is, a speaker can indicate whether the inference is based on perceptual or personal evidence, or can leave this unspecified, which means that some of the inference markers are evidentials and some are not. Finally, in past tense clauses, these markers can indicate whether the speaker is making an inference about the subject of the clause, or about the predicate of the clause. This “focusing function” is also observed in other complex epistemics.

Considering the simple and complex markers together provides perspective on the organization of the system as a whole, from which I conclude that it is best viewed as epistemic, rather than evidential. There is a subset of evidential markers within the epistemic system. This subset spans the domains of certainty and non-certainty, and does not coincide with the set of forms which other linguists working on Tibetan have called “evidentials”.

1. INTRODUCTION

Like other dialects of spoken Tibetan, an integral component of the grammar of Dokpa¹ Tibetan is its rich and intricate system of obligatory main-clause-final epistemic markers. These markers are multi-functional, often indexing tense, aspect, volitionality, and “person”, in addition to the speaker’s knowledge source and/or degree of certainty. They are never overtly translated. The system is comprised of roughly half a dozen morphologically simple forms (“simple epistemics”) which express a high degree of certainty, and a larger set of lexicalized, structurally varied, morphologically complex forms (“complex epistemics”) which express probability, possibility, inference, guessing, and the like.

Dokpa’s simple epistemics includes the seven markers corresponding to Written Tibetan (WT) *red*, *yin*, *yod*, *yod red*, *byung*, *song*, and *’dug* – which are traditionally called “evidentials” – and the cognate of *zer* which marks reported information. Here I show that these markers constitute the epistemic category of certainty, which is comprised of several evidential and non-evidential sub-systems. I demonstrate that the distribution of the simple epistemics is governed by two factors: (a) the basic pragmatic/epistemic meaning of the individual markers, and (b) contextually-specific manipulation of the markers to create an effect of intimacy or of distance, which I refer to as “engagement”. Through this manipulation a speaker can show a greater or lesser degree of engagement or involvement in the action, event, or state related in the proposition, or can express an intimate or remote perspective towards the proposition.

Elements of this distribution pattern have been observed in the “evidential” systems of other dialects of Tibetan, including Amdo (Sun 1993), Dege (Häsler forthcoming), Lhasa (Agha 1993; Chang and Shefts Chang 1984; Delancey 1984, 1985, 1986, 1990; Garret 1999, forthcoming; Tournadre and Dorje 1998; Tournadre and Jiatso 1995, etc.), Lende (Huber forthcoming), Shigatse and Themchen (Haller forthcoming), and Tabo/Spiti (Hein forthcoming). Bielmeier (forthcoming) focuses specifically on epistemic linking verbs in Balti, Purik, Tabo/Spiti, Southern Mustang, Central Ladakhi, and Nurla Ladakhi. There are several instances, in my presentation of Dokpa’s simple epistemics, where I am able to point out pragmatic functions which I have not read of elsewhere.

¹ *’drogpa* in Wylie’s transliteration system (1959).

I also address the morphologically complex markers of non-certainty, which express inference, guessing, and possibility or probability. As their cognates in other dialects have received relatively little attention in the literature, I am able to contribute several interesting observations. First, the six markers of inference are divided among evidentials, which specify the basis on which the speaker has formed his/her inference, and non-evidentials, which leave this unspecified. In comparison to these forms, I suggest that the Lhasa Tibetan marker *zhag*, which had previously also been analyzed as an inference marker (Delancey 1985, 1990), would be better interpreted as a marker of deferred evidence. I also illustrate, for past tense clauses, an interesting pattern of alternation in terms of subject focus vs predicate focus exhibited by the complex epistemics. Finally, considering the simple and complex markers together provides perspective on the organization of the system as a whole, from which I conclude that it is best viewed as epistemic, rather than evidential. There is a subset of evidential markers within the epistemic system. This subset spans the domains of certainty and non-certainty, and does not coincide with the set of forms which other linguists working on Tibetan have called “evidentials”.

In section 2 below I provide background information on the variety of Dokpa Tibetan described here, followed in section 3 by background on Tibetan morphosyntax and clause structure. In section 4 I discuss the terms “epistemology” and “evidentiality”, present the conceptual organization which I propose for Dokpa’s epistemic system, and provide a summary of the individual markers and their meaning.

In section 5 I present in detail the function and distribution of Dokpa’s markers of certainty in the “basic” pattern of use, and in section 6 I illustrate how the epistemics can be manipulated for pragmatic effect. In section 7 I focus on markers of inference, which are crucial in revealing the relationship between the categories of evidentials and epistemics. In section 8 I discuss several of other morphologically complex epistemics which indicate lower degrees of certainty. Conclusions are presented in section 9.

2. DOKPA TIBETAN

The Tibetan word “Dokpa” (*drogpa* in the standard Wylie (1959) transliteration of Written Tibetan) literally means ‘nomad’. The term is used as an autonym by people in a large

area of Western Tibet, a group unified by an economy and culture traditionally centered around livestock breeding, salt harvesting, and trading. Along with other Tibetan dialects, Dokpa falls into the Central Bodish branch of Western Tibeto-Burman (see Bradley 1997). Given their geographic range, one might reasonably expect some degree of linguistic variation among the Dokpa population. Furthermore, the speech of Dokpas living in exile may exhibit borrowings at all structural levels from other dialects and languages encountered in refugee camps and cities.

The present study of Dokpa is based on narratives and elicited examples collected predominantly during a 1998-1999 linguistics field methods class at the University of California at Santa Barbara. This body of material was supplemented by subsequent elicitation data. I characterize the variety of Dokpa presented here as “émigré” Dokpa Tibetan, as the consultant I worked with was born and grew up outside of Tibet². His idiolect includes elements of Lhasa Tibetan (LT) , which seems to be dominant in the diasporic community. He often freely alternates Dokpa and Lhasa lexical items, and the set of epistemic markers he uses are nearly identical to those of LT in terms of both form and distribution. In fact, the epistemics he uses are in just as much like those of LT as they are like those described for the variety of Dokpa (Drokpa³) presented in Kretschmar (1986).

Kretschmar’s description⁴ is based on folktales, conversations, and elicitation data collected in the Tashi Palkhyel refugee camp north of Pokhara, Nepal. She worked with six non-literate speakers (two female and four male) originally from the Bawa and Bongba Tshogu districts of Tibet. Though some of her consultants had lived in exile for more than thirty years at the time of her research, Kretschmar assumes that their dialects did not undergo significant change during this time; they were all at the age of thirty or older when they emigrated from their homeland, and they subsequently lived in communities where their native language was spoken.

² My consultant is Karma Dunden Lama, who was born in October 1975 in Sutkat, in western Nepal. His parents were originally from the Mount Kailash area of western Tibet, but emigrated to Nepal in 1959-60. They settled with other members of their family in a Tibetan community in Sutkat. When Karma was five or six years old his family moved from Sutkat to Kathmandu, again settling in a Tibetan community (Bodinath). He attended several Tibetan boarding schools in Nepal and India. He spoke Tibetan and studied English in school, but outside of school used Nepali and Hindi for day-to-day communication. At the time I worked with Karma (1998-2000), he was a student at City College in Santa Barbara, CA. He speaks English fluently, though does not have native speaker proficiency in some structures and categories.

³ I use a capital D to represent a retroflex voiced alveolar, while Kretshmar includes the /r/ overtly.

⁴ My thanks to Elke Kim and Joe Holmberg for translating sections of Kretschmar’s work from German to English.

Kretschmar is careful to point out that by “Drokpa dialect” she means the dialect of Bawa and Bongba Tshogu, though she understands Drokpa to be a regional language of southwest Tibet. It is likely that there is some variation in how the dialect is spoken by our different consultants, as their Tibetan homelands are some distance apart and their linguistic backgrounds are considerably different.

Given the breadth of her grammatical description, Kretschmar was obliged to limit her discussion of the epistemic markers. My work can thus be considered an extension of our understanding of epistemics as used by speakers who refer to themselves as Dokpa. At the same time, the extent to which my consultant’s idiolect reflects the influence of Lhasa Tibetan makes my findings accessible to a wider group of linguists.

Because Dokpa is not a written dialect, it was not possible to use either the Tibetan alphabet or Wylie’s (1959) standard transliteration system to transcribe the data collected. The transcription system used here is based on the IPA, though the following conventions should be noted:

c	palatal stop
dʒ	voiced alveo-palatal affricate
T	voiceless retroflex stop
D	voiced retroflex stop
S	voiceless palatal fricative
h	aspiration of preceding consonant

The transcription is roughly phonemic. In some cases distinctions are preserved between allophones where surface forms are relevant to morphophonemic issues (e.g., prenasalization which emerges before voiced stops which are not word-initial).

In monosyllabic words, the vowel is marked for high tone (e.g., \bar{a}) or low tone (e.g., \underline{a}). In disyllabic words the second syllable usually has neutral tone, so I leave the vowel unmarked; if σ_1 is high then σ_2 is low by comparison, and if σ_1 is low then σ_2 is high by comparison. Syllables with an initial tense consonant, marked C’, or a final glottal stop, marked ʔ, have falling tone. For some words tone was not clearly recorded and so remains unmarked; it is not relevant to the focus of this paper. Suffixes and clitics are also generally not marked for tone. I use ‘=’ to mark clitic boundaries and ‘-’ to mark suffix boundaries.

3. DOKPA MORPHOSYNTAX

3.1 General background

The order of major constituents in a Dokpa declarative sentence is SOV. The O is sometimes placed in initial position for pragmatic effect, but the verb (or other predicate) is always final. In independent or main clauses the predicate is obligatorily followed by an epistemic marker. Dependent clauses precede main clauses; most dependent clauses do not include epistemic markers.

Morphologically Dokpa is dominantly suffixing, with the exception of the negative morpheme /ma-/ which is apparently a prefix (it could also be a right-leaning enclitic; this requires further consideration). Aspect and modality markers on verb stems are suffixes; nominalizers and case markers are enclitics. The language makes extensive use of nominalization; in fact, verb inflection is considered to have originated from nominalized verb stems followed by copulas (Delancey 1991, Saxena 1997), and the suffix for the citation verb form /-pa/ is the same as the general nominalizer, as is the case in so many Tibeto-Burman languages (Matisoff 1978).

In Written Tibetan (WT), verb stems can have as many as four different forms, commonly referred to as past, present, future, and imperative. However, in Dokpa, as in many other modern dialects, these orthographic distinctions are neutralized in the spoken language; some verbs have only two phonological forms, while others have only one. In some of the data presented here there are distinct verb forms for the perfective aspect and the imperfective aspect (which occurs with present and future tenses). Perfective verb stems are so indicated in the gloss by “.PFTV”; imperfective stems are left unmarked.

3.2 Clause structure

In discussing the function and distribution of epistemic markers in Dokpa, I find it useful to consider clauses as having the following templatic structure:

“SUBJECT” + (OBJECT) + PREDICATE + EPISTEMIC

I use the term “subject” here in the traditional sense, only as an opposition to the predication; I am not suggesting that there is a grammatical category of Subject in Tibetan. In clauses with

transitive verbs, the subject is usually the first noun phrase; it is often animate and may be marked as ergative. With intransitive verbs or other monotonative predicates there will, of course, be no object.

In independent or main clauses, the epistemic markers simultaneously bear both pragmatic and syntactic functions. (A similar approach is emphasized in Bielmeier forthcoming). The pragmatic function is the epistemic meaning; the unique epistemic values for each marker are discussed in detail in subsequent sections. The syntactic function of an epistemic marker depends on the type of predicate with which it occurs.

As summarized in Table 1 below, when an epistemic occurs with a lexical verb predicate, it functions syntactically as an auxiliary verb; together with the form of the verb stem and its aspect suffix, the epistemic contributes to indexing tense. When an epistemic occurs with other (monotonative) predicates, it functions syntactically as a linking verb. Following the narrow definition provided by Payne (1997:114), I consider a linking verb which occurs with predicate nominals as a copula, and gloss it as “COP”. A linking verb which occurs with predicates which are existentials, locatives, possessives, and attributives is not, per Payne’s definition, a copula. In these cases I gloss the linking verb as “ELPA”. The distinction between these two types of linking verbs is useful in Dokpa because COP and ELPA have different forms. Some scholars of other dialects of Tibetan have used terms such as “equative auxiliary verb” and “existential auxiliary verb” (e.g., Bielmeier forthcoming) or “équatif” and “attributif” (e.g., Tournadre 1996) where I use COP and ELPA, respectively.

TABLE 1: SYNTACTIC FUNCTION OF THE EPISTEMICS

	Syntactic function of epistemic markers		
	Auxiliary verb (AUX)	Linking verb	
		COP	ELPA
Predicate type	lexical verb	nominal	existential locative possessive attributive

As illustrated by the following examples, I gloss the epistemics to reflect their dual pragmatic and syntactic functions. Thus, for example, in (1) I gloss *yin* as CPF,COP, and in (2) I

gloss the same marker as CPF,AUX. (CPF stands for “CONSCIOUS PERSONAL FACT”, an epistemic discussed below; COP stands for “copula” and AUX for “auxiliary”⁵).

(1) *predicate nominal (V/50)*

ŋa lōbTuk **yin**
 1.SG student **CPF,COP**
I am a student.

(2) *future; volitional (V/33)*

ŋa mōta s'ārpa nyũ-gi **yin**
 1.SG car new buy-IMPF **CPF,AUX**
I'm going to buy a new car.

This notation is helpful for several reasons. First, glossing the epistemics with the precise meaning which I propose for them (rather than glossing them neutrally as, say, “EPISTEMIC”) emphasizes the consistency of their use. Second, it helps clearly define which epistemics share which pragmatic features and which syntactic functions. Third, in dependent clauses, epistemics usually have only syntactic function, and this can be highlighted by the omission of the pragmatic component of the gloss. Finally, consideration of the syntactic distinctions between

⁵ Abbreviations used in this paper are given below. Epistemic markers are in bold.

ABL	ablative case	INFR.CP	inference based on current perception
AUX	auxiliary verb	INFR.PF	inference based on personal fact
COMP	comparative	INFR.UE	inference based on unspecified evidence
COP	copula linking verb	LKV	linking verb
CP	current perception	LOC	locative case
CPF	conscious personal fact	PF	personal fact
DAT	dative	PL	plural
DEF	definite article	PP	past perception
DEM	demonstrative	M	masculine
DEON	deontic	NEG	negative
DESID	desiderative	NOM	nominalizer
DUR	durative	PFTV	perfective
ELPA	existential locative possessive attributive	Q	question particle
ERG	ergative	RPT	reported
F	feminine	SG	singular
GEN	genitive	SK	speaker knowledge
GF	generic fact	SMS	it seems...
GS	guess	TAG	tag question particle
HIM	it happened to me	THINK	I think...
IMPER	imperative	TS	temporal subordinator
IMPF	imperfective	UE	unspecified evidence
INDEF	indefinite article	VBLZR	verbalizer
INFR	inference	WT	written Tibetan

some of the morphologically simple epistemics is essential to understanding the distribution of the morphologically complex epistemics discussed in sections 7 and 8.

4. EPISTEMICS AND EVIDENTIALS

As noted by de Haan (1999), most scholars assume a link between evidentiality and epistemic modality without critically examining the connection between them. My overview of the function and distribution of epistemic and evidential markers in Dokpa demands exactly such an examination. I conclude that, for Dokpa, the category of epistemic modality is superordinate over the category of evidentiality, and that the extensive set of epistemic markers includes the more limited set of evidential markers. Furthermore, I demonstrate that some of the markers which linguists have previously identified in Tibetan as “evidentials” are, in fact, epistemics, but not truly evidentials. In this section I define “epistemic” and “evidential”, and illustrate how these two categories intersect in Dokpa.

4.1 Definitions

I consider “epistemics” to be grammaticized markers which indicate the speaker’s commitment to the actuality⁶ of the preceding proposition, while “evidentials” are grammaticized markers which indicate the basis of the speaker’s knowledge of the situation described. Thus *epistemics mark degree of certainty*, while *evidentials mark source of information*. Epistemics indicate whether the speaker is claiming to be confident that the state, action or event actually

⁶ Definitions from The Random House Dictionary of the English Language. 1967. New York: Random House.
actual – existing in act or fact; real;
actuality – actual existence, reality. actual conditions or circumstances.
certain – free from doubt or reservation; confident; sure. established as true or sure; unquestionable or indisputable; fixed, agreed upon, settled.
certainty – state of being certain. something certain, an assured fact. without a doubt.
evidence – ground for belief; that which tends to prove or disprove something
factual – based on or pertaining to facts.
real – true; not merely ostensible, nominal, or apparent; existing or occurring as fact; actual rather than imaginary, ideal, or fictitious; being an actual thing; being actually such, not merely so-called. *Philos.* a. existent or pertaining to the existent as opposed to the nonexistent. b. actual as opposed to possible or potential. independent of experience as opposed to phenomenal or apparent.
reality – the state or quality of being real
truth – true or actual state of a matter. conformity with fact or reality. a verified or indisputable fact. actuality or actual existence.

occurred, or whether the situation is only probable or possible, etc.. Evidentials indicate whether the speaker saw the event, or heard about it from someone else, etc.

Similar definitions are offered fairly consistently in the literature. What is not consistent – and is sometimes vague – is how these categories are seen to relate to one another.

For instance, based on her typological examination of 50 languages (only a handful of which had grammaticized evidential markers), Bybee concludes that “evidentials indicate the source of the information expressed by the proposition...”. She includes evidentials in the category of mood (1985:28). She also includes under mood “...epistemic modalities, i.e. those that signal the degree of commitment the speaker has to the truth of the proposition. These are usually said to range from certainty to probability to possibility”(p. 165). Bybee thus views epistemic markers and evidentials as a set of mood inflections that have “some internal relations” (p. 192), but exactly what these relations are is unclear. Her statement that “evidentials definitely signal how the speaker views the truth value of the proposition” (p. 182) seems to indicate that she regards evidentials as epistemics (presumably a subcategory, as she does not suggest a symmetrical relationship). On the preceding page, however, she seems to suggest that epistemics are a subcategory of evidentials, since she refers to the evidential system of Pawnee (as described by Parks 1976) as *including* [emphasis mine] two prefixes that “resemble” epistemic moods. And then again, she says that “...an epistemic mood, especially when coupled with past tense, may signal that an occurrence is unwitnessed or inferred, and this is a function also often served by an evidential” (p. 184). The relationship between evidentials and epistemics thus remains unclear.

Willett, too, determined from his survey of the literature that evidentiality has the “basic meaning of *information source*” (1988:51). He concludes that “evidential distinctions are part of the marking of epistemic modality”, interpreting Bybee (1985), and citing Lyons (1977) who “considers an epistemically modal utterance to be one in which the speaker qualifies his/her commitment to the truth of the proposition expressed” (p. 52).

Aikhenvald reviewed evidentials as described in the grammars of over 500 languages. She defines evidentiality as “an obligatory grammatical category which has source of information as its primary meaning – whether the narrator actually saw what is being described, or made inference about it based on some evidence, or was told about it, etc.” (forthcoming:1). In terms of the relationship between epistemics and evidentials, she explicitly says that, even in

many of the complex systems, "... evidentiality is a grammatical category on its own, and not a subcategory of epistemic or some other modality" (p. 4). However, she acknowledges overlap between the categories when she says that "evidential markers often gain additional meanings and extensions such as probability of event or reliability of information (often called 'epistemic' meanings)" (p.4) Indeed, in Dokpa we observe that the evidentials have gained an epistemic meaning. Thus "evidential markers may indicate a speaker's attitude towards the validity of certain information (but do not have to)" (p. 57).

Chafe suggests that the term 'evidential' can be used in either a narrow or a broad sense (1986:262). Narrowly, it means "'evidence' per se" (by which I believe Chafe means something equivalent to "source of knowledge"). In a broad interpretation 'evidentiality' "involves attitude toward knowledge"; i.e., indicating where knowledge falls on a range of reliability. This broader interpretation is equivalent to my use of the term "epistemic".

For Oswalt (1986:43), the overlap between evidentiality and epistemic modality in Kashaya, a Pomo language of California, is relatively clear-cut: "all propositions with the Kashaya evidentials are presented by the speaker as certain and true. However, the evidentials themselves are at the top of a continuing hierarchy of modals expressing increasing uncertainty on the part of the speaker"; below evidentials he places suppositionals, speculatives, and optatives. Thus it seems that, in Kashaya, all evidentials are epistemics, though not all epistemics are evidentials. This is what I conclude for Dokpa as well.

On the other hand, the distinction between the two categories becomes very confusing with Anderson's [otherwise helpful] definition: "[e]videntials express the kinds of evidence a person has for making factual claims" (1986: 273). He provides specific criteria as definitional for evidentials: "(a) Evidentials show the kind of justification for a factual claim which is available to the person making that claim, whether direct evidence plus observation (no inference needed), evidence plus inference, inference (evidence unspecified), reasoned expectation from logic and other facts, and whether the evidence is auditory, or visual, etc.; (b) Evidentials are not themselves the main predication of the clause, but are rather a specification added to a factual claim ABOUT SOMETHING ELSE; (c) Evidentials have the indication of evidence as in (a) as their primary meaning, not only as a pragmatic inference. (d) Morphologically, evidentials are

inflections, clitics, or other free syntactic elements (not compounds or derivational forms)” (p. 274-275).

Aikhenvald concurs with (a), (b), and (c), but points out that (d) is problematical for languages in which the distinction between inflection and derivation is not clear-cut. She suggests that the surface expression of an evidential should perhaps not be part of its definition. I agree that (b) and (c) are crucial, but in my view, (a) is even more problematic. By explicitly including in (a) both of the [undefined] terms “justification” and “factual”, Anderson makes it impossible to distinguish the categories of evidential and epistemic. He apparently equates “justification” with “evidence”; but if “factual” means that the speaker wishes to convey to the hearer that s/he is certain about the truth of the propositional content, then Anderson seems to suggest that certainty and evidence must always go together. This is not the conclusion that other researchers have come to, nor is it what we observe in Dokpa. Furthermore, uniting these terms would seemingly not permit “reasoned expectation” as justification; it seems that “reasoned expectation” might easily be used in reference to a proposition about which the speaker is not certain. Finally, I find it difficult to consider “inference (evidence unspecified)” to be evidentiality at all, as the speaker is explicitly not presenting evidence, nor is it even clear that the claim is necessarily factual. (Per my definitions, such a term is an epistemic but not an evidential.)

However, such a terminological twist is not unique. Jacobsen uses the term “evidential” to refer exactly to “...a linguistic category which applies to predications that the speaker assumes have a reasonable likelihood of being true, but which he cannot vouch for out of direct observation or experience” (1986:3). Such a definition would exclude Oswald’s Kashaya evidentials, which indicate both observation and truth. Similarly, the “Evidential Proper” of Pawnee is used for “events that the speaker is certain of, but to which s/he was not an eyewitness” (Parks 1976; as cited in Bybee 1985:185).

de Haan accounts for some of this confusion by considering implications across the categories of epistemic modality and evidentiality. Consistent with others, he says “[e]videntiality deals with the source of information for the speaker’s utterance, while epistemic modality concerns itself with the degree of commitment on the part of the speaker to his/her utterance” (1999:84). He goes on with greater precision: “Epistemic modality EVALUATES

evidence and on the basis of this evaluation assigns a confidence measure to the speaker's utterance. ... An evidential ASSERTS that there is evidence for the speaker's utterance but does not interpret the evidence in any way" (p.85; emphasis original). Relating these processes, he quotes Frajzyngier (1985:250): " '...[I]t appears rather obvious that the different manners of acquiring knowledge correspond to different degrees of certainty about the truth of the proposition...' ", which leads de Haan to propose a [non-absolute] universal that "direct evidence (e.g. visual and auditory evidence) is more believable than indirect evidence (e.g. inference and hearsay)" (1999:86-87).

It is because of the intuitive correlation pointed out by Frajzyngier that the two categories are so often confused. Few scholars make a sufficiently careful distinction between the ASSERTION and the EVALUATION of evidence. And it is exactly because of this intuitive correlation that Dokpa's evidentials are – secondarily – also epistemics. In Dokpa – though not necessarily in every language – evidence implies certainty. The contrary is not also true; epistemics are not, by implication, also evidentials.

With the exception of Jacobsen (1986) and Parks (1976), then, the literature is fairly consistent, and my terminology is compatible with the general view: *epistemics mark degree of certainty*, and *evidentials mark source of information*. Linguists may be led to conflicting conclusions about which is superordinate and which subordinate simply because the conceptual organization, intersection, and means of grammatical marking of these categories may be language-specific. In Dokpa Tibetan, at least, the relationship is relatively clear. In Dokpa – and in other dialects of Tibetan – the degree of certainty is indicated in every sentence and in every epistemic marker, while source of evidence is not. Only some of the epistemic markers also code evidence. Thus epistemic modality is superordinate and evidentiality is subordinate.

4.2 Epistemics and evidentials in Dokpa

In this section I present a conceptual overview of Dokpa's epistemic system, which is substantiated by the data which follows in sections 5 through 8. I provide this here so that readers familiar with the systems of other languages can immediately consider the categories and relationships I propose, and those familiar with other dialects of Tibetan can draw direct comparisons to the form and function of the markers they know.


Figure 1 below represents the relationships between categories of epistemic markers in Dokpa. The outer-most box, Box 1, is labeled **epistemics**. Every element in the entire system is an indicator of the speaker's *degree of certainty* about the information conveyed in the proposition.

The set of epistemics includes markers of **certainty** (everything inside Box 2) and markers of non-certainty (everything outside Box 2). There is a general iconic correlation between morphological and semantic complexity: at the heart of the system, certainty is marked by morphologically simple forms, while more qualified assessments are marked by morphologically complex forms. (Note that I do not attempt here to arrange the markers of non-certainty according to any kind of system or hierarchical order.)

Box 3 is labeled **evidentials**. Everything within this box is an indicator of the speaker's *source of evidence* for his/her assertion. There are two crucial points to note about the set of evidentials. First, it extends beyond the set of certainty markers. That is, Dokpa includes four markers (*yin sā yǒʔ*, *yǒ' sā yǒʔ*, *yin sā duk*, *yǒ' sā duk*) which allow a speaker to specify what his/her evidence is for something about which s/he is not certain. This category is actually not as unnatural as it seems: all of these markers indicate inference, and they specify the evidence which is the basis of inference. I have not seen such a category described elsewhere in the literature on other languages; Hein (forthcoming) briefly mentions markers with a similar meaning in the Tabo/Spiti dialect of Tibetan. The second point to note is that, while *reʔ* and *yǒ' reʔ* are within the set of **certainty** markers, they are not included in the set of **evidentials**, which is where most linguists have placed them.

As noted, the markers which I consider evidentials are also, secondarily, epistemic. As evidentials they convey the source of information, and as epistemics they convey the speaker's commitment to the truth of the proposition.

FIGURE 1: DOKPA'S EPISTEMICS AND EVIDENTIALS



The ellipses in Figure 1 reflect three categories of evidentials: a. personal, b. perceptual, and c. reported. The **personal** evidentials signify that the speaker has authority for the claim made because s/he was a participant in the action, event, or state described⁷. There are three morphologically simple personal evidential markers of certainty (*yin*, *yö?*, and *tSuy*) and two morphologically complex personal evidential markers of non-certainty (*yin sä yö?* and *yö sä yö?*, which mark inference based on personal knowledge). Forms with *yin* and *yö?* indicate that the speaker was the subject (A or S) of the proposition, while *tSuy* indicates that the speaker was

⁷ Similar to the “Performative” noted in Kashaya by Oswald (1986), a term he adopted before it was used to describe speech acts.

the patient or goal. The **perceptual** evidentials indicate that the speaker knows what s/he is talking about through perceptual evidence (either visual or visceral). There are two perceptual evidentials of certainty (*duk* and *soŋ*) and two perceptual evidentials of non-certainty (*yin sā duk* and *yö sā duk*, which mark inference based on perception. There is only one **reported** evidential, *sa*, which marks both reported speech and hearsay. I have not looked closely at the distribution of this morpheme, so I am not sure whether it can mark both certainty and non-certainty (hence the dashed ellipse).

I believe Dokpa's set of morphologically-complex markers of non-certainty is more extensive than shown here (as indicated by the "etc." in box 1). I have included, as representative of the set, only the two markers of guessing (*yin Do* and *yö Do*), the two markers meaning "I think..." (*yin ci reʔ* and *yö ci reʔ*), and the six markers that indicate inference (*yin sā yöʔ*, *yö sā yöʔ*, *yin sā duk*, *yö sā duk*, *yin sā reʔ*, and *yö sā reʔ*). These forms all occur in Lhasa Tibetan, as well as in Dokpa. There are many other forms documented in Lhasa which are probably also used in Dokpa, but which I have not pursued in working with my consultant. The complex epistemics will be discussed in greater detail in sections 7 and 8, with particular focus on the markers of inference.

In summary, the system marks several broad oppositions: certainty vs. non-certainty; evidential vs. non-evidential; personal vs. perceptual. Table 2 below summarizes the glosses for the epistemic markers shown in Figure 1.

TABLE 2: MEANING OF DOKPA'S EPISTEMIC MARKERS⁸

	Markers of certainty			Markers of non-certainty		
	Form	ABBR	GLOSS	Form	ABBR	GLOSS
Evidentials	duk ⁹	CP	CURRENT PERCEPTION	yin sa duk	INFR.CP	INFERENCE BASED ON CURRENT PERCEPTION
	soŋ	PP	PAST PERCEPTION	yö sa duk		
	yö?	PF	PERSONAL FACT	yin sa yö?	INFR.PF	INFERENCE BASED ON PERSONAL FACT
	yjn	CPF	CONSCIOUS PERSONAL FACT	yö sa yö?		
	tSuŋ	HM	"HAPPENED TO ME"			
	sa	RPT	REPORTED			
Non-evidentials	re?	GF	GENERIC FACT	yin sa re?	INFR.UE	INFERENCE BASED ON UNSPECIFIED EVIDENCE
	yö re?	SK	SPEAKER KNOWLEDGE	yö sa re?		
				yjn Do	GS	GUESS
				yö Do		
				yin ci re?	THNK	"I THINK..."
			yö ci re?			

The function and distribution of the markers of certainty (the simple epistemics) are illustrated in section 5. The markers of non-certainty (the complex epistemics) are described in sections 7 and 8.

5. MARKERS OF CERTAINTY – THE “BASIC” PATTERN

In this section I describe the basic pattern of use of the morphologically simple epistemics, which are all indicators of certainty. By “basic” pattern – a term also used by Bielmeyer (forthcoming) – I refer to their unmarked distribution, which is founded on their core semantic meanings. Native speakers seem to consider this as the grammatical underpinning of the system, as it is the pattern which consultants give first in translating English sentences out of context. This is the case not only for my own work on Dokpa, but also apparently for other

⁸ My simple epistemics (markers of certainty) correspond to Kretschmar's (1986:88) auxiliaries and copulas /jɿn/, /ö?/ ~ /ö:/, /tuk/, /tik/, /re?/ ~ /re:/, /ö: re?/ ~ /ö: re:/, /te:/, /ö: te:/. Of this group, I have not, in my study, encountered the forms /tik/ (Kretschmar herself only noted it on a single occasion) or /te:/ and /ö: te:/. My impression is that Kretschmar observes no difference in the use of re? and ö re?, which I find to have different functions. Kretschmar also includes the respectful forms /jɿn la:/ and /re: la:/.

My complex epistemics (markers of non-certainty) correspond to Kretschmar's “dubitative” forms /ö:ci/, /ö:ci re?/ ~ /ö:ci re:/, /jɿnci/, /jɿnci re?/ ~ /jɿn:ci re:/, /ö:to/, /önto/, /jɿnto/: /ö:sa/, /ö:sa re?/, /jɿnsa/, /jɿnsa re?/.

⁹ The form *zhag* /Saŋ/ which occurs in Lhasa Tibetan (but not in Dokpa) would also occur here.. I would gloss it as DP, for DEFERRED PERCEPTION. This will be discussed further below.

Tibetan dialects and other languages such as the Mongolic language Minhe Mangghuer (Slater, 1998). In section 6 I go on to demonstrate how this pattern is manipulated for pragmatic effect, according to the parameter I term “engagement”.

I have chosen to use, almost exclusively, examples with either 1st person or 3rd person subject. Like other Tibeto-Burman languages, Dokpa is characterized by what is often referred to as a “conjunct/disjunct” marking system. These patterns were initially reported by Hale (1980) for Kathmandu Newari, and have also been noted in Tibetan and Minhe Mangghuer. In Tibetan, the conjunct epistemics are those which occur with 1st person declaratives and 2nd person interrogatives, in complements of verbs of speaking or thinking when the embedded subject is coreferential with the matrix subject, and in most dependent clauses. The disjunct epistemics are those which occur with 2nd and 3rd person declaratives and 1st person interrogatives, in complements of verbs of speaking or thinking when the embedded subject is not coreferential with the matrix subject, and in certain dependent clauses. The only alternation relevant here is that observed in declarative and interrogative sentences, as illustrated by the following examples.

(3) 1st person (VII/43,9/6/00)

ŋa pöpa yin
1.SG Tibetan CONJUNCT”
I am Tibetan.

ŋa pöpa re? =pe
1.SG Tibetan “DISJUNCT” =Q
Am I Tibetan?

(4) 2nd person (VII/43)

chö? pöpa re?
2.SG Tibetan “DISJUNCT”
You are Tibetan.

chö? pöpa yin =pe
2.SG Tibetan “CONJUNCT” =Q
Are you Tibetan?

(5) 3rd person (VII/43)

khō pöpa re?
3.SG.M Tibetan “DISJUNCT”
He is Tibetan.

khō pöpa re? =pe
3.SG.M Tibetan “DISJUNCT” =Q
Is he Tibetan?

In actual practice, my consultant is reluctant to use a bare disjunct form in declarative sentences with 2nd person subjects; thus the declarative in (4) is somewhat marked. It is apparently impolite, presumptuous, or simply odd to make direct statements about one’s addressee. It is more common to add a clause-level clitic to form a tag question, as in the following:

(6) 2nd person, polite statement (9/6/00)

chö? pöpa yin =pa

2.SG Tibetan "CONJ" =TAG

You're Tibetan, huh. / You're Tibetan, aren't you?

We can observe this in English as well; it is pragmatically more common to ask: "are you Tibetan?" or to form a tag question: "you're Tibetan, aren't you?" rather than to simply say: "you're Tibetan". In Tibetan the oddness of such bald statements is heightened by the fact that one must end the clause with an epistemic, and the addressee, in most cases, will be a better authority for his/her own actions or states than will the speaker. I have thus avoided 2nd person subjects in my examples; we know that, in theory, they would use the same marker as 3rd person subjects in declarative statements; in practice, tag questions or interrogatives would be more likely.

Also, in most of my examples, the arguments are singular. Epistemic markers are governed by person, but do not vary according to number (or gender).

This overview is structured according to the categories presented in Figure 1. Perceptual and personal evidentials are discussed in sections 5.1 and 5.2, respectively, while non-evidential markers of certainty are discussed in section 5.3. For markers which can function syntactically as both an auxiliary verb and a linking verb, examples are provided to illustrate each use. The reported evidential is considered briefly in 5.4.

5.1 Perceptual evidentials

There are two perceptual evidentials which index speaker certainty: *duk* (CP) marks CURRENT PERCEPTION, and *soŋ* (PP) marks PAST PERCEPTION. Thus these differ inherently in terms of tense and aspect. Syntactically, *duk* functions as an ELPA linking verb (when it occurs with predicates which are existentials, locatives, possessives or attributives) and also as an auxiliary verb (when it occurs with lexical verb predicates). *soŋ* functions only as an auxiliary verb.

5.1.1 *duk* (CURRENT PERCEPTION)

The CURRENT PERCEPTION evidential *duk* (CP) essentially tells the hearer “you can believe what I’m telling you because I’m observing it right now”. “Perception” most commonly refers to visual observation, but it can also refer to auditory observation (though not olfactory) or to physical sensation or personal feeling. Temporally, *duk* is used to talk about present or present perfect events or states. It is also most commonly used to describe the actions or states of others (i.e., what others would refer to as a disjunct pattern), since the speaker does not usually observe him/herself.

Though my gloss of *duk* as CURRENT PERCEPTION suggests observation coinciding with the time of speech, this is not strictly the case. *duk* is also appropriate if the speaker has recently (say, within the past few hours) witnessed the state or event reported, and is relating this specific instance of observation to the hearer. This idea of specificity is consistent with what Goldstein (1984:xvi) has noted for Lhasa: “The ‘*dug*’ verb is used when one has firsthand knowledge (or on rare occasions, when there is impeccable secondhand information from someone having such knowledge) and certainly conveys this; but, and this is important, it also conveys a dimension I shall call “specificity”. Specificity refers to the fact that ‘*dug*’ is always used with respect to knowledge deriving from a specific situation or state and is never used for general, usual, or commonly known situations or states.”

duk has its origin in the lexical verb meaning ‘to sit, to stay’ (WT ‘*dug*’).

5.1.1.1 *duk* as an ELPA linking verb

The following examples show *duk* functioning syntactically as an ELPA linking verb. Although the linking verbs are generally tense-neutral, *duk* conveys a sense of existence at the time of speech, since the speaker is making an immediate observation.

As an illustration of the use of *duk* when perception does not exactly coincide with the time of speech, my consultant explained that (8), for instance, would be appropriate both if the speaker and hearer were standing together and could together observe the situation, or if the speaker made the observation alone and then walked to the house to report this recently-witnessed specific situation to the hearer.

- (7) *existential predicate* (VIII/6/8/00)
 paglep **duk**
 bread CP,ELPA
There is bread.
- (8) *existential predicate* (IV/81)
 Singe: naŋ=la t'āk **duk**
 field.GEN inside=LOC tiger CP,ELPA
There's a tiger in the field.
- (9) *locative predicate* (IV/81)
 t'āk Singe: naŋ=la **duk**
 tiger field.GEN inside=LOC CP,ELPA
The tiger is in the field.
- (10) *locative predicate* (IV/25)
 mŋ lab naŋ=la **duk**
 3.SG.F lab inside=LOC CP,ELPA
She is in the lab.
- (11) *possessive predicate* (V/39, VI/49)
 nyima=la peSak te:s **duk** / * re?
 [NAME]=DAT money little.bit CP,ELPA / * GF,LKV
Nima has some money.
- (12) *attributive predicate* (IV/51)
 t'ā te tShēmpo **duk**
 horse DEF big.NOM CP,ELPA
The horse is big.

Example (13) illustrates the use of *duk* when the speaker's perception is physical. The word for 'soft' seems to belong to the limited set of adjectives in Dokpa, characterized by its reduplicated form and the absence of the imperfective suffix, which one would expect if it were a lexical verb 'be soft'.

- (13) *attributive predicate; physical perception* (IV/69)
 nya:tj bo:βo **duk**
 bed soft CP,ELPA
The bed is soft.

5.1.1.2 *duk* as an auxiliary verb

In the examples below, *duk* functions as an auxiliary verb. When *duk* is used in combination with the imperfective suffix (IMPF) *gi ~ ki*, the action or event described by the

clause is understood to be taking place at the time of speech; i.e., to indicate present tense. *duk* is not used with clauses that describe actions, events, or states which occur in the future. Obviously a speaker cannot have perceptual evidence for nor express certainty about an event that has not yet occurred. In (14) *duk* is overtly used in a case of perception.

(14) *overt perception (IV/65)*

ɲye: dza thōŋ-gi duk
 1.SG.ERG rainbow see-IMPF CP,AUX
I see a rainbow.

(15) *intransitive verb*

khō sa-gi duk
 3.SG.M eat-IMPF CP,AUX
He's eating.

(16) *transitive verb (IV/61)*

khō yige Tj-gi duk
 3.SG.M letter write-IMPF CP,AUX
He's writing a letter.

For the following example, Karma says that *duk* is appropriate if the speaker either sees the rain or hears it. Thus the CURRENT PERCEPTION marker includes auditory evidence.

(17) *auditory evidence (1/27/99)*

tSarpa pap-ki duk
 rain fall-IMPF CP,AUX
It's raining.

However, *duk* is not appropriate when the speaker's evidence is olfactory. If the speaker sees the dinner burning, as in (18), *duk* is appropriate, but if s/he cannot see it burning but only smells it, then my consultant says "so you have to guess", and uses *yō s̄ā re?*, (INFERENCE BASED ON UNSPECIFIED EVIDENCE) instead, as in (19).

(18) *visual evidence (1/27/99)*

S'a tsik-k duk
 meat burn-IMPF CP,AUX
The meat is burning.

(19) *olfactory evidence* (1/27/99)

S'ā tsik-ki * duk / yō sā re?
meat burn-IMPF * CP,AUX / INFR.UE,AUX
[I infer] The meat is burning.

Examples (20) through (22) illustrate the use of *duk* when the speaker's perception is personal and unobservable (i.e., the state described cannot be confirmed by another person), whether it is a sensation or an internal feeling. (Note that in (21) and (22) the deontic and desiderative modal suffixes occurs in the same slot as the imperfective aspect marker *gi*.)

(20) *physical sensation* (VI/50)

ŋa ne-gi duk
1.SG be.sick-IMPF CP,AUX
I'm sick.

(21) *physical sensation*

ŋa ky'ūk-go duk
1.SG vomit-DEON CP,AUX
I need to / have to vomit.

(22) *personal feeling* (E.Kim, 1/27/99)

ŋa Dō-'dō duk
1.SG go-DESID CP,AUX
I want to go.

It is typical, cross-linguistically, for perceptual evidentials to be appropriate with visual and auditory evidence, but not with other types of sensory evidence, such as olfactory (Willett 1988, Aikhenvald forthcoming). What seems unusual here is the *duk* also includes tactile evidence as well as personal sensation and desire.

While *duk* is most commonly used with present imperfective activities or events, as illustrated above, it can also be used to mark perfect aspect, when it follows the perfective form of a verb stem and when the speaker has current perceptual evidence to support his/her claim that the event took place. This extension to perfect aspect seems a natural extension from present to present relevance. In (23) the speaker did not witness the girl's tumble, but arrived on the scene

to see her already lying on the ground. Likewise (24) would be appropriate if the speaker did not witness his friend writing the letter, but now sees the letter itself and know who wrote it.¹⁰

(23) *perfect aspect* (IV/47)

m̥o rj: duk
 3.SG.F fall.PFTV CP,AUX
She fell. / She has fallen.

(24) *perfect aspect* (IV/61, V/64)

khō yige Tj: duk
 3.SG.M.ERG letter write.PFTV CP,AUX
He wrote a letter. / He has written a letter.

5.1.2 *soŋ* (PAST PERCEPTION)

The PAST PERCEPTION evidential *soŋ* essentially tells the hearer “you can believe what I’m telling you because I saw it happen”. With *soŋ*, “perception” refers to visual or auditory observation, as well as physical sensation. Given its semantic meaning, *soŋ* adds an inherent sense of past perfective tense/aspect. Thus it only occurs after perfective verb stems (when distinct forms exist); it never follows the imperfective marker *gi~ki*, and is never used with clauses describing present or future actions or events. Furthermore, because of its inherent past tense, *soŋ* can only be used as an auxiliary verb and never as a linking verb. *soŋ* is derived from the perfective form of the lexical verb meaning ‘to go’. I gloss *soŋ* as PP for PAST PERCEPTION.

As with *duk*, *soŋ* is most commonly used to describe the activities of others since the speaker does not usually observe him/herself. However, *soŋ* can be used to describe the speaker’s own actions to create a sense of psychological distance. This marked use will be discussed in section 6, with other illustrations of how the basic system is manipulated.

Examples (25) and (26) illustrate the use of *soŋ* with past visual observation. The square brackets in (27) mark an embedded clausal complement.

(25) *visual evidence* (IV/45)

chōʔ rj: soŋ
 2.SG fall.PFTV PP,AUX
You fell.

¹⁰ In Lhasa Tibetan the epistemic *zhag*, interpreted by others as a marker of inference, would be used here. I discuss this further in section 7.

(26) 3rd person subject (IV/61, V/64)

khō̄ yjge Tj: sŋ
3.SG.M letter write.PFTV PP,AUX
He wrote a letter.

(27) auditory evidence (III/121)

khō̄ [ŋa=la sa] lap sŋ
3.SG.M.ERG 1.SG=DAT eat tell.PFTV PP,AUX
He told me to eat.

5.2 Personal evidentials

There are three personal evidentials which index speaker certainty. With each of these, the speaker assures the hearer that s/he can be believed because s/he was involved in the state, action, or event described. I gloss *yōʔ* (PF) as PERSONAL FACT, *yjn* (CPF) as CONSCIOUS PERSONAL FACT, and *tSuŋ* as “it HAPPENED TO ME”. Both *yōʔ* and *yjn* function syntactically as both linking verbs and as auxiliary verbs. Like *sŋ*, *tSuŋ* is inherently perfective, and functions only as an auxiliary verb.

In some respects, *yjn* and *yōʔ* can be considered to lie at the heart of the system. Morphosyntactically, they form the basis of the complex epistemics, and are the only markers to occur in many types of subordinate clauses. They were likely the two forms first grammaticized as epistemics from lexical verbs, *yjn* from the Old Tibetan copula and *yōʔ* from the Old Tibetan existential. As epistemics/evidentials, *yjn* and *yōʔ* have retained these linking verb functions¹¹, and they also function as auxiliary verbs. Their correlates in WT are *yjn* and *yod*, respectively, which are the only two markers which have clear correlates in all the spoken dialects (Bielmeier forthcoming).

Scholars of Lhasa Tibetan have used different terms for what I call the personal evidentials. Agha (1993:157) refers to *yj̄*, *yō̄*, and *cuj* as ‘P’ forms, for “Participant specific” verbs which index speech-act participants. These contrast with the ‘~P’ (“Participant non-specific”) forms *rē*, *tū*, and *sō̄*, which lack indexical specificity. Denwood (2000) refers to *yjn*, *yod*, and *byung* as ‘self-centered’ verbs or auxiliaries, in contrast to *red*, ‘*dug*, and *song*

¹¹ Note that Bielmeier (forthcoming) does not consider cognates of WT *yod* to be function as a linking verb with locative and possessive predicates, because the subject is marked as dative/locative case.

which are ‘other-centered’. Tournadre and Dorje (1998) refer to the cognates of *yin* and *yod* as “égophorique”, as the speaker is referring to his/her own actions. This term is opposed to “heterophorique”, for markers used where the proposition refers to the activities of someone else.

Languages with an evidential category which marks knowledge via personal involvement are relatively rare, outside the Tibeto-Burman family. An exception is Kashaya (Oswalt 1986) which has “performative”¹² evidentials used to mark the speaker’s own actions, much as *yin* and *yod* are in Tibetan. Kashaya’s performative suffixes “signify that the speaker knows of what he speaks because he is performing the act himself or has just performed it” (1986:34).

5.2.1 *yöʔ* (PERSONAL FACT)

The PERSONAL FACT epistemic *yöʔ* essentially tells the hearer “you can believe what I’m telling you because I’m personally involved”. That is, the speaker has the epistemic authority to speak about his/her own actions or states. Thus *yöʔ* is usually used to talk about the speaker’s own actions or states; the marked use of *yöʔ* to talk about the states or actions of others is discussed in section 6.

According to Saxena (1997) and others, *yöʔ* is derived from Old Tibetan’s original existential verb. It still maintains this function as an ELPA linking verb, but in modern spoken Tibetan it also functions as an auxiliary verb and, in both syntactic uses, also has epistemic force. Dokpa’s *yöʔ* corresponds to WT’s *yod*.

In some ways, *yöʔ* can be seen as the correlate of *duk*. Both function as ELPA linking verbs; as auxiliary verbs both mark the present tense when they follow the imperfective marker *gi*; both can be used to mark perfect aspect. However, since *duk* marks perception it is usually used with non-1st person subjects, and since *yöʔ* marks personal involvement it is usually used with 1st person subjects. (In the traditional terminology one would say that *duk* is a disjunct evidential and *yöʔ* is a conjunct evidential.)

¹² Oswalt chose this terminology in about 1959, before “performative” came to be used in speech act studies.

5.2.1.1 *yö?* as an ELPA linking verb

In these examples, *yö?* functions as a linking verb with predicates which are existentials, locatives, possessives, and attributives. I have no example of an existential predicate, as my consultant felt that a statement like “I exist” would be extremely odd. Note that (33) would be appropriate, instead of (32), if the speaker were looking in a mirror or watching him/herself on video.

(28) *existential predicate* (9/6/00)

– no example –

(29) *locative predicate* (V/101)

tanda / ndaŋgoŋ ŋa naŋ=la yö?
 today / yesterday 1.SG home=LOC PF,ELPA
Today I'm at home. / Yesterday I was at home.

(30) *possessive predicate* (IV/23)

ŋa=la tSa yö?
 1.SG=DAT bird PF,ELPA
I have a bird.

(31) *attributive predicate* (VII/115)

ŋa kyakpa yö?
 1.SG fat PF,ELPA
I am/was fat.

(32) *attributive predicate* (IV/3,V/69)

ŋa sūkpo riŋpo yö?
 1.SG body long PF,ELPA
I am tall.

(33) *attributive predicate* (3/17/99)

ŋa sūkpo riŋpo duk
 1.SG body be.long CP,ELPA
I'm tall.

(34) *attributive* (V/37)

[chī Si tu] ŋa kyakpa yö?
 dog die.PFTV? TS 1.SG fat PF,ELPA
At the time the dog died, I was fat.

5.2.1.2 *yǒʔ* as an auxiliary verb

In the examples below, *yǒʔ* functions as an auxiliary verb. As noted above, when *yǒʔ* is used in combination with the imperfective suffix (IMPF) *gi ~ ki*, the action or event described by the clause can have a present tense reading; *yǒʔ* can also have a habitual reading.

(35) *present imperfective*. (V/69)

ŋa 'golf' ts'ē-gi yǒʔ
 1.SG golf play-IMPF PF,AUX
I'm playing golf. (right now)

(36) *habitual* (IV/111)

takpar ŋa naŋ=la Do-gi yǒʔ
 every.day 1.SG house=LOC go-IMPF PF,AUX
Every day I go home.

Like *duk*, *yǒʔ* has a sense of present relevance and so can be used to mark the perfect aspect when it follows a verb in its perfective stem form (though recall that not all verbs have distinct perfective stems). The context for the following is that Karma_i, an artist, has been working on a portrait. His client_j calls to find out if it's finished, so he_j can come pick it up, and Karma_i responds that it's not. Square brackets delineate two conjoined independent clauses, both of which have a perfect reading.

(37) *perfect* (VIII/33)

[ŋe: Tj: yǒʔ] yīyan [tshō t'āŋ ts'ār meʔ]
 1.SG.ERG draw.PFTV PF,AUX but color do/paint finish NEG.PF,AUX
I have drawn it, but I haven't painted it yet.

The next examples suggest that we should interpret *yǒʔ* as not having strictly present relevance, but as more broadly having temporal relevance. Note that in (38) and (40) *yǒʔ* and its negative *meʔ* refer to an event which had relevance not to the time of speech, but to some other time in the past. With *yin*, in (39), there is no sense of temporal relevance.

(38) *perfect* (VIII/32)

tetu ŋa Tj-gi Te yǒʔ
 that.time 1.sg draw-IMPF DUR PF,AUX
At that time, I was drawing.

(39) *perfective* (VIII/31)

ɲye ʈi: yin
1SG.ERG draw.PFTV CPF,AUX
I drew it.

(40) *perfect* (III/120;9/6/00)¹³

[ndaŋgoŋ ɲa Sā sa-ⁿdö tSuŋ] yĩyā [(ɲye:) se: me?]
yesterday 1.SG meat eat-DESID HM,AUX but (1.SG) eat.PFTV NEG.PF,AUX
Yesterday I wanted to eat meat but I didn't.

The behavior of *yö?* in Dokpa is similar to the behavior of its cognates as described for other dialects. However, one element of *yö?*'s meaning which I have not read of elsewhere is the sense that the claim made by the speaker could be verified by the hearer. In a number of examples in which *yö?* (or a complex epistemic beginning with *yö*) was used, Karma said “you can see”, or “you can go and look”. This suggests that actions, events, or states marked with *yö?* are [visually] verifiable. This is actually another sense in which *yö?* is similar to most occurrences of *duk*: when *duk* is used, the speaker is indicating current perceptual evidence, and the hearer, also present in most cases, could presumably verify the statement for him/herself. It is possible that this sense of *yö?* exists in other dialects as well.

5.2.2 *yin* (CONSCIOUS PERSONAL FACT)

Just like the PERSONAL FACT epistemic *yö?*, the CONSCIOUS PERSONAL FACT epistemic *yin* essentially tells the hearer “you can believe what I’m telling you because I’m personally involved”. However, *yin* has an added connotation of speaker consciousness, awareness, or engagement, whose interpretation with lexical verbs and with other predicate types is discussed in the sections below. (Kretschmar 1986 used the term “engagement” to capture this sense of *yin*; a term which I use elsewhere with a different meaning.) Since a speaker cannot have knowledge of such internal conditions for anyone but him/herself, in the basic pattern *yin* is used with 1st person subjects. The marked use of *yin* with non-1st person subjects is discussed in section 6.

¹³ This is actually a very interesting construction. Syntactically ‘want’ seems to be a main verb, since it controls the choice of epistemic. Phonologically, though, it appears to be a desiderative modal suffix, since the prenasalization surfaces. This warrants further investigation.

yin was the only copula in Old Tibetan (though its use was optional; Beyer 1992). In modern spoken Tibetan it still serves as a linking verb with predicate nominals, but it also functions as an auxiliary verb. Saxena (1997) suggests that *yin* is derived from the present tense form of the verb meaning ‘to go’.

Just as *yö?* can be seen as a correlate of *duk*, so *yin* can be seen as a correlate of *re?*, discussed below. Both *yin* and *re?* function as COP linking verbs, and as auxiliary verbs both mark the future tense when they follow the imperfective marker *gi~ki*. However, since *yin* marks personal involvement it is usually used with 1st person subjects, and since *re?* marks unspecified evidence, it is usually used with non-1st person subjects (i.e., *re?* is a “disjunct” epistemic and *yin* is a “conjunct” epistemic; *yin* is a personal epistemic and *re?* is not.).

5.2.2.1 *yin* as a COP linking verb

As noted previously, I define a copula narrowly as a linking verb which occurs with predicate nominals only (following Payne 1997:114). The examples below illustrate the use of *yin* as a copula.

(41) *predicate nominal* (V/50)

ŋa lōbTuk **yin**
 1.SG student CPF,COP
I am / was a student.

(42) *predicate nominal* (1/27/99)

[chī Si] =tu ŋantso lōbTuk **yin**
 dog die.PFTV =TS 1.PL student CPF,COP
We were students when the dog died.

(43) *complex sentence* (IV/5, V/37)

[ŋa tuku **yin**] =tu kyakpa **yö?**
 1.SG child COP =TS fat PF,ELPA
When I was a child, I was fat.

When *yin* functions as a linking verb, the sense of “consciousness” or “awareness” that is part of its meaning conveys a sense that the speaker is accepting his/her state. This becomes more clear when *yin* and *yö?* are directly contrasted in section 5.2.3.

5.2.2.2 *yin* as an auxiliary verb

With lexical verb predicates, the “consciousness” conveyed by *yin* is interpreted as an expression of volition or intention. As illustrated by the examples below, when *yin* follows an imperfective verb stem and the imperfective suffix *ki~gi*, the clause has a future tense reading. Here, *yin* conveys not that the speaker has personal evidence of the event itself (which is not possible as it has not yet occurred), but of his/her intention to make it happen. When *yin* follows a perfective verb stem, the clause has a past tense reading, and the speaker is conveying not only that an event occurred, but also that the action was deliberate.

(44) *future; intransitive* (IV/111)

ŋa naŋ=la Dɔ-gi **yin**
 1.SG home=LOC go-IMPF CPF,AUX
I will go home.

(45) *future; transitive* (V/33)

ŋa mɔta s'ārpa nyū-gi **yin**
 1.SG car new buy-IMPF CPF,AUX
I'm going to buy a new car.

(46) *past; intransitive* (IV/111)

ŋa naŋ=la tʂj: **yin**¹⁴
 1.SG home=LOC go.PFTV CPF,AUX
I went home.

(47) *past; transitive* (IV/81)

ŋye: t'ā t'āk **yin**
 1.SG.ERG horse tie CPF,AUX
I tied the horse.

Since *yin* expresses volition or intention, in its unmarked use it generally occurs with what Hargreaves (1991) identified in Kathmandu Newari as “control” verbs; i.e., verbs which express actions which can be self-initiated. In Kathmandu Newari this includes verbs such as *drink, hit, run, dance, cook, and give*.. These are contrasted with “non-control” verbs, such as *melt, mature, be lost, find, spill, die, and fall* which describe actions which (in Kathmandu Newari) are not self-initiated. “Fluid” verbs, per Hargreaves, are those which can be used in

¹⁴ Note that Dokpa differs from Lhasa Tibetan in the omission of the “nominalizer” / perfective aspect suffix *-pa* following the verb stem.

either way, such as *touch*, *bump*, *kick*, *sneeze*, and *cough*. These categories do not seem to be as clear-cut in Tibetan as they are in Kathmandu Newari. Nonetheless, there is indeed a tendency in Dokpa to use *yin* with verbs describing actions which can be controlled, as illustrated by the preceding examples (and to use *soŋ*, *tSuŋ*, or *reʔ* – discussed below – with non-control verbs). However, it is possible to use *yin* with a verb which is not inherently a control verb in order to convey that the speaker acted deliberately, as discussed by Kelly (1999) and illustrated in (48).

(48) *volitional act* (IV/45, V/65)

ŋa	ri:	yin
1.SG	fall.PFTV	CPF,AUX

I fell (intentionally).

Such pragmatically marked uses are neatly accounted for in the Shigatse and Themchen dialects of Tibetan by Haller (forthcoming), who makes a useful distinction between verbs, which are lexically specified as ‘controllable’ or ‘non-controllable’, and events, which can be volitional or non-volitional. Haller demonstrates that the distinct categories of control, volition, and evidentiality can be combined in various ways. Agha (1993) makes a similar distinction in Lhasa Tibetan between ‘agentive’ and ‘non-agentive’ verbs but demonstrates that not all combinations of verb and evidential are possible. That is, non-agentive verbs cannot occur with the *-pa yĩ* ending in the perfective (where Dokpa uses simply *yin*). Non-agentive verbs also do not have imperative stem forms. Dokpa may show similar patterns, though I have not examined verb categories in such detail.

Finally, a speaker cannot have the epistemic authority to assert the volition of another, so sentences such as (49) are unacceptable.

(49) 2nd or 3rd person subject (V/65)

* chöʔ / khō	rj:	yin
2.SG / 3.SG.M	fall.PFTV	CPF,AUX

* *You/he fell (intentionally).*

5.2.3 CONTRASTING *yin* AND *yöʔ*

In the unmarked uses described above, the epistemics *yöʔ* and *yin* complement one another in some obvious ways. As a linking verb, *yöʔ* is used with ELPA predicates and *yin* is

used with predicate nominals. As an auxiliary verb, *yöʔ* marks present tense or temporal relevance, while *yin* marks past and future tenses (following perfective and imperfective verb stems, respectively). Further, *yöʔ* sometimes suggests that the hearer could verify the speaker's statement him/herself, which is not possible in contexts in which *yin* is used. Finally, *yöʔ* often has a sense of temporal relevance, while *yin* often conveys a sense of permanence or timelessness.

However, *yin* and *yöʔ* can also be used contrastively – with both lexical verb predicates and with other predicate types – to mark more subtle pragmatic distinctions, some of which not occur in only a few other Tibetan dialects.

5.2.3.1 As linking verbs...

In their unmarked uses in Dokpa, *yin* is used with predicate nominals, and *yöʔ* is used with existential, locative, possessive, and attributive (ELPA) predicates. I consider this pattern unmarked since it appears to be most common, and since it is what a speaker will consistently give in elicited examples without a specified context. However, these linking verbs can be interchanged to achieve marked pragmatic effects. That is, *yöʔ* can apparently be used with predicate nominals, and *yin* can be used with some ELPA predicates. Although their syntactic roles are thus reversed, their pragmatic senses are preserved. That is, in its marked use with an attributive predicate, the “consciousness” element of *yin*'s meaning contributes a sense of self-acceptance, or of the permanence of a state or condition. Likewise, in its marked use with a predicate nominal, *yöʔ* seems to convey that something of the speaker's identity can be observed by others outside him/herself.

Examples (50) and (51) below illustrate the contrast between *yin* and *yöʔ* with predicate nominals. The use of *yin* in (50) is unmarked, while the use of *yöʔ* in (51) is marked. This latter example is marked with a “?”, as my consultant's assessments of its grammaticality have varied. At times when *yöʔ* seemed acceptable to him, he explained that there was something about the speaker's appearance that would suggest to another that s/he was a student, and that the hearer could verify this by looking.

(50) *predicate nominal; unmarked construction*

ŋa lōbTuk yin
1.SG student CPF,COP
I am a student.

(51) *predicate nominal; marked construction*

? ŋa lōbTuk yō?
1.SG student PF,ELPA
I am a student.

My consultant was fully confident and consistent in contrasting the following examples in which both *yin* and *yō?* are used with an attributive predicate. Here, the use of *yō?* in (52) is unmarked, while the use of *yin* in (53) is marked. In (52), the condition of being fat is ascribed to the time referred to in the speech event, whether it is present or past; this is consistent with *yō?*'s sense of temporal relevance. In translating (53), on the other hand, Karma used the adverb “still”, indicating that the state is persistent; this again suggests that he is drawing a contrast to an ephemeral state in (52). (An alternative interpretation would be that *kyakpa* means ‘fat person’ in (53), and *yin* is thus used with a predicate nominal after all, but this is not how Karma explained the difference.)

(52) *attributive predicate; unmarked construction (VII/115)*

ŋa kyakpa yō?
1.SG fat PF,ELPA
I am/was fat.

(53) *attributive predicate; marked construction (VII/115)*

ŋa kyakpa yin
1.SG fat CPF,COP
I am [still] fat.

In the following pair, Karma says that when he uses *yō?* he is simply stating a verifiable personal fact: “people can see I’m tall”, but when he uses *yin* he is “accepting myself”. This is again a manifestation of the “consciousness” element of *yin*'s meaning.

(54) *attributive predicate; unmarked construction (3/17/99)*

ŋa sūkpo rinpo yō?
1.SG body (be?).long PF,ELPA
I'm tall.

(55) *attributive predicate; marked construction (3/17/99)*

ŋa sukpo r̄iŋpo yin
 1.SG body (be?).long CPF,COP
I'm tall.

This potential for alternations between *yin* and *yö?* in Dokpa is highly unusual. In most other Tibetan dialects, the occurrence of cognates of WT *yin* with predicate nominals and of WT *yod* with ELPA predicates is reportedly strictly maintained. An exception is Lende Tibetan, as described by Huber (forthcoming), where alternations similar to Dokpa's are observed (e.g., cognates of *yin* and *yö?* can both be used with predicate nominals and with color terms and other attributive predicates). Also anomalous is the use of a cognate of WT *yin* with possessive predicates in Southern Mustang (Kretschmar 1995, as reported in Bielmeier forthcoming).

5.2.3.2 As auxiliary verbs...

In strict syntactic terms, after the imperfective marker *gi~ki*, *yö?* indicates present tense and *yin* indicates future tense. The temporal distinctions between them can be blurred, however, just as they can in an English sentence such as "I'm going tomorrow". However, there is still a pragmatic contrast. Epistemically, when *yö?* is used in such cases the speaker is making a factual statement about what *s/he will* do, while *yin* expresses what the speaker *wants* to do. With *yö?* in examples (56) and (57), my consultant says "I plan to; I have to, I want to, I'm sure"; a listener "would be really surprised if I didn't". When *yin* is used, the speaker expresses volition, but there is less certainty that the event will take place. My consultant says of the use of *yin* in (56): "I will go, but maybe I won't actually go. Right now I feel that tomorrow I'll want to go"; but a listener "wouldn't be so surprised if I didn't."

(56) *intention vs. fact (V/69):*

sajnyɪ ŋa Dɔ-gi yö? / yin
 tomorrow 1.SG go-IMPF PF,AUX / CPF,AUX
Tomorrow I'm going. , Tomorrow I'll go.

(57) *intention vs. fact; future action (V/85):*

sajnyɪ ŋa Tokpo=la kük-gi yö? / yin
 tomorrow 1.SG friend=DAT wait-IMPF PF,AUX / CPF,AUX
Tomorrow I will wait for my friend.

Interestingly, it is also possible to use *yin* with present progressive actions. In discussing the following example, Karma again said that *yöʔ* indicates fact and *yin* indicates desire or intention, but also noted that *yin* may be used if the speaker is currently engaged in the activity under his/her own volition. The distinction between *yin* and *yöʔ* in that context is not presently clear to me.

(58) *intention vs fact; present action (IV/22):*

ŋa	lāpta=la	Dɔ-gi	yöʔ / yin
1.SG	school=LOC	go-IMPF	PF,AUX / CPF,AUX

I'm going to school.

The examples in this section demonstrate that even when *yin* and *yöʔ* are interchanged syntactically, whether as linking verbs or as auxiliary verbs, they preserve their pragmatic essences. The fact that *yin* and *yöʔ* can be used contrastively is one of the reasons why I avoid the terms “conjunct” and “disjunct”, which are so common in descriptions of other Tibetan dialects¹⁵. Both *yin* and *yöʔ* would be glossed as “CONJUNCT” in all of these examples, thus completely obscuring the essential distinction between them.

5.2.4 *tSuŋ* (“HAPPENED TO ME”)

The personal fact epistemic *tSuŋ* essentially means “you can believe what I’m telling you, because this happened to me.” Thus when a speaker ends a clause with *tSuŋ*, s/he is claiming to have been directly affected by the event described or to have been on the receiving end of some action or change of state. The connotation “this happened to me” means that events described by *tSuŋ* necessarily happened in the past. That is, like *soŋ*, *tSuŋ* has an inherently perfective reading and so never occurs with the imperfective marker *gi~ki*, never occurs in clauses describing states or events which take place in the present or future, and never occurs with predicate nominal or ELPA predicates.

tSuŋ is derived from a lexical verb meaning ‘happened, occurred, arose’. Over time it has evidently acquired a personal, or egophoric, epistemic sense. I gloss *tSuŋ* as HM, for it

¹⁵ See also Garret (1999:1) for other relevant factors which are not captured by the original meaning of conjunct and disjunct.

HAPPENED to ME. This gloss captures the use of *tSuŋ* with different predicate types, and with the speaker in diverse semantic roles.

tSuŋ can be used when the speaker is the Experiencer of a stative or non-control intransitive verb, the patient of a transitive verb, or the recipient of a ditransitive verb.

(59) *Experiencer of a stative verb (VI/50)*

ŋa na tSuŋ
1.SG sick HM,AUX
I got sick.

ŋa ne-gi duk
1.SG sick-IMPF CP,AUX
I'm sick.

(60) *Experiencer of a non-control intransitive verb (VI/65-66)*

ndaŋgoŋ ŋa rj: tSuŋ
yesterday 1.SG fall.PFTV HM,AUX
Yesterday I fell.

(61) *Patient of a transitive verb (VI/45)*

chi=gi ŋa=la mō(k) tSuŋ
dog=ERG 1.SG=DAT bite HM,AUX
The dog bit me.

In both (62) and (63) below the speaker is the recipient of a ditransitive verb. In (62) this is overtly marked. In (63) it is implicit; the sentence is understood to mean “he wrote a letter, and I know this is true because I got it.”

(62) *Recipient of ditransitive verb (VI/15)*

khō ŋa=la yige Tj: tSuŋ
3.SG.M.ERG 1.SG=DAT letter write.PFTV HM,AUX
He wrote me a letter.

(63) *Recipient of ditransitive verb (VI/64)*

khō yige Tj: tSuŋ
3.SG.M.ERG letter write.PFTV HM,AUX
He wrote [me] a letter.

In such examples the speaker has a choice between *tSuŋ* and *soŋ*, the former emphasizing the speaker’s affectedness and the latter simply reporting an event of which s/he has past experiential knowledge, as illustrated below:

(64) *epistemic choice* (V/79)

khō=gi ṅa=la thep tS'ik T'e? tSuj / son
 3.SG.M=ERG 1.SG=DAT book INDEF give HM,AUX / PP,AUX
He gave me a book.

tSuj is also used with Experiencer verbs, such as 'see', 'want', and 'meet' in the perfective ('meet' as in an encounter, as opposed to an introduction), as illustrated by the following examples. (In (65) the square brackets bound the Patient of the main verb, while in (66) they indicate clause boundaries.)

(65) *Experiencer verb 'see'* (VI/10):

ṅye: [Dē: sa-khē pu te] (ṅye:) thōṅ tSuj
 1.SG.ERG rice eat-NOM boy DEF (1.SG.ERG) see HM,AUX
I saw the boy who ate the rice.

(66) *Experiencer verb 'want'* (III/120;9/6/00)

[ndaṅgoṅ ṅa Sā sa ndö tSuj] yīyā [(ṅye:) se: me?]
 yesterday 1.SG meat eat want HM,AUX but (1.SG) eat.PFTV NEG.PF,AUX
Yesterday I wanted to eat meat but I didn't.

(67) *Experiencer verb 'meet'* (IV/102, V/64):

khō ṅye ndaṅgoṅ thūk tSuj
 3.SG.M 1.SG.ERG yesterday meet.PFTV HM,AUX
I met him yesterday.

As the following examples show, *tSuj* can only be used if the speaker is the one who was affected by the action:

(68) *3rd person affected participant* (V/64)

ndaṅgoṅ mō: ṅa=la thūk * tSuj
 yesterday 3.SG.F.ERG 1.SG=DAT meet.PFTV * HM,AUX
**intended: She met [i.e., encountered] me.*

(69) *3rd person affected participant* (V/103)

ndaṅgoṅ khō ṅa=la / *mō=la ke tSuk tSuj
 yesterday 3.SG.M.ERG 1.SG=DAT / *3.SG.F=DAT laugh cause HM,AUX
*Yesterday he made me / *her laugh.*

(70) *2nd person affected participant* (V/65-66)

ndaṅgoṅ ṅa / *chō? rj: tSuj
 yesterday 1.SG / *2.SG fall.PFTV HM,AUX
*Yesterday I / *you fell.*

(71) 2nd person affected participant (IV/45)

chõʔ ri: sɔŋ
2.SG fall PP,AUX
You fell.

The following example illustrates how the speaker can select from among several evidential options to complete a particular sentence. The unmarked epistemic in (72) is *tSuŋ*, since ‘fall’ is a non-control verb and the speaker is affected by the action. This is the epistemic first given by my consultant with no specified context. The use of *yin* and *sɔŋ* is also possible, though both are marked. It would be appropriate to use *yin* if the speaker had fallen deliberately, and it would be appropriate to use *sɔŋ* if the speaker wishes to distance him/herself from the event, as if s/he were standing outside him/herself and observing. Such “manipulation” of the system is discussed more fully in section 6.

(72) epistemic options (IV/45)

ŋa ri: tSuŋ / yin / sɔŋ
1.SG fall.PFTV HM,AUX / CPF,AUX / PP,AUX
I fell.

Of course, the speaker cannot use epistemic markers to suggest that another person fell deliberately, as s/he cannot know the intentions of another. Thus (73) is unacceptable.

(73) 2nd person volitional act (V/65):

chõʔ ri: *yin
2.SG fall.PFTV * CPF,AUX
* You fell.

5.3 Non-evidentials

In this section I describe the two markers of certainty which are not evidentials: *reʔ* (GF), the GENERIC FACT epistemic, and *yõʔ reʔ* (SK) the SPEAKER KNOWLEDGE epistemic. These markers indicate that the speaker is certain about the information conveyed in the proposition, but do not convey to the hearer what kind of evidence the speaker has to support this claim. This might be because the speaker does not need to provide the evidence (as with universally-known facts), because evidence is pragmatically unnecessary, or because the speaker simply chooses not to specify his/her evidence.

While *reʔ* and *yõʔ reʔ* both serve to present a proposition as an established fact, it seems that *reʔ* is used when knowledge of the action or state is widely available, and *yõʔ reʔ* is used when the speaker has proprietary knowledge (at least, in comparison to the hearer). Both *reʔ* and *yõʔ reʔ* function as auxiliary verbs and as linking verbs.

Note that in describing *reʔ* and *yõʔ reʔ* as non-evidentials I break from much of the previous literature. In work on other dialects they are often simply categorized as “evidentials”, together with cognates of the markers discussed above. Some researchers (e.g., Garret in progress; Lhasa) consider them markers of “indirect evidence”, but based on my data they are more accurately considered as unspecified for evidentiality. Agha (1993; Lhasa) considers *reʔ* (as well as *yin*) a ‘factive’, indicating certainty, rather than an evidential.

5.3.1 *reʔ* (GENERIC FACT)

The GENERIC FACT epistemic *reʔ* essentially tells the hearer “you can believe what I’m telling you because it is a fact.” *reʔ* is unspecified for evidentiality; using *reʔ*, the speaker does not indicate linguistically whether or not s/he has perceptual, personal, or hearsay evidence to support his/her assertion. *reʔ* can thus be used when the speaker lacks such evidence. Alternatively, *reʔ* can be used when the speaker does have perceptual or hearsay evidence, but simply opts not to specify his/her knowledge source. The propositional content is simply presented as a fact. *reʔ* can be considered the most semantically neutral of all the epistemics and so in many cases can be substituted for the other more specific epistemics.

Like the other epistemics, *reʔ* functions as both a linking verb and an auxiliary verb. It is not attested in Old Tibetan, but apparently arose later to create a contrast with the developing egophoric sense of *yin*. The Written Tibetan correlate to Dokpa’s *reʔ* is *red*. I have seen no hypotheses in the literature to suggest a source for this epistemic, and the only lexical verb I have found which is similar in form is *re*, which means ‘to hope’. To suggest that *re* is the source of *red* and *reʔ* would be pure speculation, at this point.

5.3.1.1 *reʔ* as a linking verb

Interestingly, it seems that *reʔ* can serve as a linking verb with predicate nominals and with some ELPA predicates (locational and attributive only), thus collapsing the distinction that exists between *yɪn* and *yöʔ*. This may be an outcome of *reʔ*'s mysterious diachronic origin: while *yɪn* originated as a COP linking verb which developed into the CONSCIOUS PERSONAL FACT epistemic, and *yöʔ* originated as an ELPA linking verb which developed into the PERSONAL FACT epistemic, *reʔ* seems to have arisen specifically to contrast with the PERSONAL element of *yɪn* and *yöʔ*. Thus it is conceivable that restrictions on the occurrence of *reʔ* with different predicate types simply did not develop. Because *reʔ* occurs with both predicate types, I gloss it as LKV (LINKING VERB), rather than as either COP or ELPA. In the basic pattern, *reʔ* is used with 2nd and 3rd person subjects only.

In the following examples *reʔ* serves as a linking verb with predicate nominals.

(74) 2nd person subject (9/6/00)

chõʔ lōbTuk reʔ
2.SG student GF,LKV
You are a student.

(75) 3rd person subject (IV/16)

khō lōbTuk reʔ
3.SG.M student GF,LKV
He is a student.

(76) inanimate subject (VIII/6/11/00)

te paglep reʔ / * duk
that bread GF, LKV / * CP,ELPA
That is bread.

In the examples below *reʔ* serves as a linking verb with some of the ELPA predicates – notably, with locatives and attributives, but not with existentials and possessives. It would not be appropriate for a speaker to claim perceptual evidence for (80) (unless s/he were in space looking at the earth); this is a widely-known and generally accepted fact. In some cases *duk* can be used instead of *reʔ* if the speaker has current perceptual evidence to support the assertion. However, note that *duk* can occur with existential and possessive predicates, which *reʔ* cannot.

- (77) *existential predicate, *re?* (VIII/6/8/00)
 paglep duk / *re?
 bread CP,ELPA / *GF,LKV
There is bread.
- (78) *locative predicate* (IV/69)
 nyaltSe marpo nyalti kaŋ=la duk / re?
 blanket red bed.GEN top=LOC CP,ELPA / GF,LKV
The red blanket is on the bed.
- (79) *possessive predicate, *re?* (V/39, VI/49)
 nyima=la peSak te:s duk / * re?
 [NAME]=DAT money little.bit CP,ELPA / * GF,LKV
Nima has some money.
- (80) *attributive predicate* (1/27/99)
 dzamliŋ korkor¹⁶ re?
 earth round GF,LKV
The earth is round.
- (81) *attributive predicate* (IV/69)
 nyaltSe marpo duk / re?
 blanket red CP,ELPA / GF,LKV
The blanket is red.¹⁷
- (82) *attributive predicate; specific observation* (IV/51)
 t'a te tSempo duk
 horse DEF big.NOM CP,ELPA
The horse is big.
- (83) *attributive predicate; generic fact* (IV/51)
 t'a te tSempo re?
 horse DEM big.NOM GF, LKV
The horse is big.

5.3.1.2 *re?* as an auxiliary verb

In the following examples, *re?* functions as an auxiliary verb. *re?* is syntactically parallel to *yin* in that, when it follows an imperfective verb stem with the imperfective suffix *ki~gi*, the

¹⁶ Another member of the limited set of true adjectives in Dokpa, which typically have reduplicated form and are not followed by the nominalizer *-pa* or the imperfective suffix *-gi*.

¹⁷ In Lende Tibetan, color terms can be used with either COP or ELPA linking verbs (Hüber, personal communication June 2000).

clause has a future tense reading, and when it follows a perfective verb stem, the clause has a past tense reading. Pragmatically *re?* differs from *yin* in that it does not convey volition or intention and so is not limited, in the basic pattern, to the speaker's own actions.

The following pairs illustrate the use of *duk* to mark present tense and *re?* to mark future tense, when they follow the imperfective marker.

(84) *present* (1/27/99)

tSarpa pap-ki **duk**
rain fall-IMPF CP,AUX
It's raining.

(85) *future* (1/27/99)

tarin tSarpa pap-ki **re?**
today rain fall-IMPF GF,AUX
It's going to rain today.

(86) *present* (IV/61)

khō yige Tj-gi **duk**
3.SG.M letter write-IMPF CP,AUX
He is writing a letter.

(87) *future* (IV/61)

khō yige Tj-gi **re?**
3.SG.M letter write-IMPF GF,AUX
He will write a letter.

In the future tense, *re?* can also be used instead of *yin* when the speaker is talking about his/her own actions, but wishes to avoid expressing volition. If *re?* is used in (88), Karma says that it is a guaranteed fact that he will be a rich man; if *yin* is used, as in (89), then this is an expression of volition or intention, as reflected by Karma's remark "I want to become, so I promise to." The fact that *re?* is used with the future tense is consistent with the fact that it is an epistemic marker of certainty, but not an evidential; a speaker cannot have evidence for something that has not yet occurred.

(88) *Ist person, future fact* (IV/9)

nankar ŋa tSukpo tSak-ki **re?**
next.year 1.SG rich.NOM? become-IMPF GF,AUX
I will be rich next year.

(89) *1st person, intention (IV/9)*

nankar ŋa tSukpo tSak-ki yin
 next.year 1.SG rich.NOM? become-IMPF CPF,AUX
I will be rich next year.

In the past tense, *re?* can be substituted for evidential markers of certainty if the speaker chooses not to specify the source of his/her evidence. For example, when *soŋ* is used in (90) and (91), the speaker is claiming to have witnessed the event, while *re?* makes no assertion of evidence.

(90) *past, 2nd person (IV/45)*

chō? ri: soŋ / re?
 2.SG fall.PFTV PP,AUX / GF,AUX
You fell.

(91) *past, 3rd person (IV/37)*

mō lāpta=la Dō soŋ / re?
 3.SG.F school=LOC go PP,AUX / GF,AUX
She went to school.

Even more options are available to the speaker in example (92). If *tSuŋ* is used, the speaker is saying “I know he wrote a letter, because I received it”, with *soŋ* the speaker is saying “I know this because I saw him while he was writing it”, with *duk* the speaker is saying “I see the letter and I know he’s the one who wrote it, though I didn’t see him write it”, and *re?* means “I just know this is true”. Per Karma, *re?* could be used even if the speaker did see his friend write the letter, or sees the letter itself, or was told about the event by someone else; however, *re?* remains unspecified for evidentiality.

(92) *epistemic options in the past tense (IV/61;V/64)*

khō yige Tj: tSuŋ / soŋ / duk / re?
 3.SG.M.ERG letter write.PFTV HM,AUX / PP,AUX / CP,AUX / GF,AUX
He wrote a letter.

5.3.2 *yō re?* (SPEAKER KNOWLEDGE)

The SPEAKER KNOWLEDGE epistemic *yō re?* has the morphological form of a compound composed of *yō?* plus *re?*, and both elements are reflected in its epistemic meaning. Like *re?*, *yō?*

reʔ is unspecified for evidentiality; that is, the speaker presents a fact without claiming to have perceptual or reported evidence to support his/her assertion or to be personally involved in the state or event described. And, like *yōʔ*, *yō reʔ* conveys that the speaker has some kind of proprietary knowledge which gives him/her the epistemic authority to speak. In contrast, though, while *reʔ* is used with past or future states or events, *yō reʔ* is used to describe present (or habitual) states or events. And while *yōʔ* is used when the speaker is talking about him/herself, *yō reʔ* is used in talking about others. Thus *yō reʔ* complements both *yōʔ* and *reʔ* while incorporating elements of their meanings.

yō reʔ essentially tells the hearer “you can believe what I’m telling you because it is a fact of which I, personally, have knowledge.” It is used when the speaker lacks specific perceptual evidence (in which case *duk* would be preferred) and is not involved in the action or event (in which case *yōʔ* would be preferred).

5.3.2.1 *yō reʔ* as an ELPA linking verb

The examples below illustrate the use of *yō reʔ* with existential, locative, possessive, and attributive predicates. In the basic pattern *yō reʔ* is used with 2nd and 3rd person subjects, while *yōʔ* would be used with 1st person subjects.

The following was given in response to the question “Are there tigers in Nepal?”

(93) *existential predicate* (2/3/99):

ō̄, t’āk **yō: reʔ**
 yes, tigers SK,ELPA
Yes, there are tigers.

The pair below illustrates the contrast between *duk* and *yō reʔ*. *duk* is appropriate for a specific instance of actually seeing the tiger in the field. Thus a speaker would say (94) if s/he had just seen the tiger, or just learned this by seeing it. In (95), on the other hand, *yō reʔ* is appropriate if the tiger can generally be found in the field, but might not actually be there at the time of speech. Karma says “It’s a fact that there’s a tiger in the field. It was there, and it will be there. It lives there. I saw it many times; however, it might not be there at this minute.” Example

(94) also illustrates the inappropriateness of using *yö?* with a 3rd person subject in a locative clause.

(94) *locative predicate; specific instance (IV/81)*

Şnqe naŋ =la t'āk **duk** / *yö?
 field.GEN inside LOC tiger CP,ELPA / PF,ELPA
There's a tiger in the field.

(95) *locative predicate; general situation (IV/81, VI/23):*

Singe naŋ=la t'aq **yö re?**
 field.GEN inside=LOC tiger SK,ELPA
There's a tiger in the field.

This contrast illustrates the proprietary element of the speaker's knowledge; as noted previously, when *duk* is used, the hearer could presumably verify the speaker's claim for him/herself, by simply looking; this is not true of *yö re?* The same contrast exists when the "location" is a time. In (96), *duk* is appropriate if the speaker is looking at a calendar or at a notice in the newspaper; in (97) *yö re?* is appropriate if the speaker has other knowledge of the meeting that the hearer does not share.

(96) *locative predicate; specific instance (VI/13):*

sapemba=la tsoŋdu **duk**
 Saturday=LOC meeting CP,ELPA
There's a meeting on Saturday.

(97) *locative predicate; general situation (VI/13):*

sapemba=la tsoŋdu **yö re?**
 Saturday=LOC meeting SK,ELPA
There's a meeting on Saturday.

The examples below illustrate the use of *yö re?* with possessive and attributive predicates. Again, *duk* is used if there is current perceptual evidence to support the claim (e.g., seeing the person with money in his/her hand in (98)). Example (99) also illustrates the unacceptability of using *re?* with a possessive predicate.

(98) *possessive predicate; specific instance (V/39, VI/49)*

nyima=la peSak te:s **duk** / *re?
 [NAME]=DAT money little.bit CP,ELPA / *GF,LKV
Nima has some money.

(99) *possessive predicate; general situation* (V/39, VI/49)

nyima=la peSak te:s **yö re?** / * **re?**
[NAME]=DAT money little.bit SK,ELPA / * GF,LKV
Nima has some money.

(100) *attributive predicate; general situation* (S&J,4)¹⁸

Simikot=ki nāmthaj p'ē sarpo **yö re?**
Shimikot.GEN airport very steep SK,ELPA
Shimikot's airport is very steep.

(101) *attributive predicate; specific instance* (IV/51)

t'ā te tSēmpo **duk**
horse DEF big.NOM CP,ELPA
The horse is big.

(102) *attributive predicate; general situation* (IV/51)

t'ā te tSēmpo **yö re?**
horse DEM big.NOM SK,ELPA
The horse is big.

Of course, if the speaker wished to make this assertion without expressing proprietary knowledge, s/he could choose the GENERIC FACT epistemic, as we saw in (83) above.

5.3.2.2 *yö re?* as an auxiliary verb

When *yö re?* is used with a lexical verb, the action or event is interpreted as habitual, as in (103), which contrasts with (104) which describes a specific instance observed at the time of speech (and observable also by the hearer). Note that both have the same English translation.

(103) *habitual activity* (VI/13)

khō lāpta=la pō k'ē? tSaŋ-gi **yö re?**
3.SG.M school=LOC Tibetan language study-IMPF SK,AUX
He's studying Tibetan at school.

(104) *specific instance* (VI/13)

khō lāpta=la pō k'ē? tSaŋ-gi **duk / * yö?**
3.SG.M school=LOC Tibetan language study-IMPF CP,AUX / * PF,AUX
He's studying Tibetan at school.

¹⁸ Transcript "Shimikot and Jumla", clause 4.

(105) *habitual activity* (V/65)

khō lāpta=la D_Q-gi yō re? / * re?
 3.SG.M school=LOC go-IMPF SK,AUX / * GF
He goes to school.

(106) *specific instance*

khō lāpta=la D_Q-gi duk
 3.SG.M school=LOC go-IMPF CP,AUX
He's going to school.

5.4 Reported information

The REPORTED evidential *sa* or *-s* (RPT) is almost certainly derived from the lexical verb meaning ‘to say’, which in WT is *zer* (*/se(r)/*). Word-final vowels are followed by *-s*; consonants are followed by *sa* in careful speech and by *-s* in rapid speech. RPT does not exist in a paradigmatic relationship with the other epistemics, as demonstrated by the fact that it can co-occur with several of them.

In the following examples, from narrative texts, my consultant is relating a story that was told to him by his father and uncle about an encounter with a leopard. Note that he uses the epistemic marker that was originally used when he was told the story. That is, *duk* in (107) is the epistemic that his father originally uttered. The parenthetical material is not part of the free translation, but part of my consultant’s explanation.

(107) *Leopard Story* (VI/55)

āni ŋye āpa=gi che? tinte kō duk sa
 so 1.SG.GEN father=ERG noise some.kind hear CP,AUX RPT
So (I was told) my father heard some kind of noise.

(108) *Leopard Story* (VII/25)

tj=ki thak kyap te=la sik ts’āŋ duk sa
 this=GEN cliff behind DEF=LOC leopard nest CP,ELPA RPT
Behind this cliff was a leopard’s nest.

(109) *Leopard Story* (VI/89)

sig=gi āma tSik tō: =ne lēp soŋ sa
 leopard=GEN mother INDEF appear =ABL come.PFTV PP,AUX RPT
So (they said) a mother leopard appeared from there. [from behind the boulder]

In the examples below the RPT marker has the form *-s*.

(110) *Clever Prime Minister* (J. Park)

gyalkhap tSik =la lömpo tSik yō re-s
 kingdom INDEF =LOC prime.minister INDEF SK,ELPA-RPT
In one kingdom, there was a prime minister.

More than one reported evidential marker can be used in a single sentence, as seen in (111).

(111) *Clever Prime Minister* (J. Park)

khō: di-gi-re-s lap re-s lömpo te=ki
 3.SG.ERG be.okay-IMPF-GF,LKV-RPT say.PFTV GF,AUX-RPT prime.minister that=ERG
He said "Okay", that prime minister.

Thus we see the REPORTED information marker following the perceptual evidentials *duk* and *soŋ*, as well as the non-evidential markers of certainty *re?* and *yō re?*. These epistemics can function as both auxiliary verbs and as linking verbs (except for *soŋ* which is never a linking verb, as discussed previously). I have not seen any instances of RPT following the personal evidentials *yin*, *yō?*, or *tSuŋ*, nor would I expect to: a speaker's claim of knowledge of an event or state through personal involvement is incompatible with a claim of knowledge through hearsay.

The marker of reported information is different from – though perhaps related to – the marker used in direct quotation within a narrative, as shown by the following. Note that in this example the speaker does not use the REPORTED evidential after *re?* at the end of the sentence; it need not be used consistently throughout a narrative.

(112) *Clever Prime Minister* (J. Park)

chō?=ki ŋa=la t'ā tSik chyē Sok suŋ re?
 2.SG=ERG 1.SG=LOC horse INDEF bring IMPER tell.HONGF,AUX
"You must bring me a horse", he said.

At this point I am not sure whether *sq ~ -s* is used to mark only certainty, or whether it can mark non-certainty as well (hence the dashed ellipse in Figures 1 and 2). My impression is that the latter is the case, but this needs further exploration.

As pointed out by Aikhenvald (forthcoming), “evidential” systems can be comprised of several subsystems; markers belonging to different subsystems can co-occur, but those within one subsystem cannot. We have seen in the preceding examples that *sq* can co-occur with several of the other epistemics: with the evidentials *duk* and *soj*, and with the non-evidentials *re?* and *yin*. This is evidence that *sq* belongs to a different subsystem. Furthermore, the following example shows *re?* and *duk* co-occurring, which is evidence that they, too, must belong to distinct subsystems. The context for the following is that several people had been told that one of them would go to Nepal. On entering the room the speaker sees a plane ticket on the table with Pasang’s name on it, and realizes that in fact Pasang is the person who is going to Nepal. The addition of the CURRENT PERCEPTION evidential to the clause terminating in the GENERIC FACT epistemic indicates that the speaker is somewhat surprised by this new information.

(113) *co-occurring epistemics* (VII/41)

Nepal=la Pasang Do=ye **re** **duk**
 Nepal=GOAL [NAME] go=NOM GF,AUX CP,AUX

Pasang is going to Nepal. (Pasang is the one going to Nepal, Pasang is the Nepal-go-er.)

These co-occurrence patterns support classification of the epistemic markers of certainty into the three subsystems – evidential, non-evidential, and reported – which comprised the structure of this overview.

6. MANIPULATION OF THE “BASIC PATTERN”

In section 5 above I described the basic pattern of use of Dokpa’s markers of certainty. As noted, the basic pattern is defined as the unmarked distribution of the epistemics, which is congruent with their core epistemic meaning. An example of this is the use of a personal evidential (e.g., *yin* or *yö?*) to describe one’s own state or actions (which other researchers term “conjunct” or “égophorique”), or the use of a perceptual evidential (i.e., *duk* or *soj*) to describe the state or activities of another person (a usage which has elsewhere been termed “disjunct” or “heterophorique”).

There is a second, context-specific parameter which is also a factor in the speaker’s epistemic choice. This is the option of using a personal epistemic to talk about someone else, to create an effect of intimacy; or of using a perceptual evidential or non-evidential to talk about

oneself, to create an effect of distancing. I refer to this pragmatic parameter as “engagement”, and to these alternative uses as “manipulation” of the system. Through such manipulation of the system the speaker can show a greater or lesser degree of engagement or involvement in the action, event, or state related in the proposition; s/he can take an intimate or a remote stance.

Note that manipulation of the system entails different types of alternations than most of those demonstrated above. Previously we saw alternations within the set of markers consistent with the type of knowledge which the speaker would most likely have regarding the subject of the clause, as seen in the following:

(114) *non-speaker subject* (IV/61, V/64)

khō̄ yige Tj: tSun̄ / sɔŋ / duk / re?
 3.SG.M.ERG letter write.PFTV HM,AUX / PP,AUX / CP,AUX / GF,AUX
He wrote a letter.

(115) *speaker subject* (3/17/99)

ŋa sūkpo rɪŋpo yō? / yin
 1.SG body (be?).long PF,ELPA / CPF,COP
I'm tall.

Manipulating the system entails alternations across the sets of epistemics used in (114) and (115). What is indicated by epistemic choice in this case is not epistemic modality or evidentiality, but speaker perspective, or engagement.

In sections 6.1 and 6.2 below I illustrate how a speaker, through epistemic choice, can create an effect of intimacy or an effect of distance in clauses with different predicate types. In section 6.3 I review similar patterns in other dialects of Tibetan and in other languages.

6.1 Creating an effect of intimacy

A speaker can create a sense of intimacy or greater involvement in describing the states or activities of others by using epistemics which are usually used to talk about 1st person subjects. This is warranted if the speaker has a personal connection of some kind with either the subject or the predicate of the clause. This is illustrated for the different predicate types below.

6.1.1 With predicate nominals and ELPA predicates

In (116) through (118) the predicate is a nominal. The speaker would have the epistemic authority to use *yin* in (118) if s/he has some association with the subject's role as a teacher (e.g.,

the subject is/was specifically the speaker's teacher). That is, the speaker has a connection with the predicate of the clause. According to my consultant, *yin* would not be licensed if the speaker's connection were with the subject of the clause; e.g., if the subject were the speaker's parent.

(116) *1st person subject, unmarked (9/6/00)*

ŋa kēkā: **yin**
 1.SG teacher CPF,COP
I am a teacher.

(117) *3rd person subject, unmarked (9/6/00)*

khō kēkā: **re?**
 3.SG.M teacher GF,LKV
He is a teacher.

(118) *3rd person subject, intimacy (9/6/00)*

khō ŋe: kēkā: **yin**
 3.SG.M 1.SG.GEN teacher CPF,COP
He is my teacher.

In the following three examples the speaker is commenting on the whereabouts of his/her mother (locative predicate). In (119) the speaker can see his/her mother, or has just seen her, and so knows specifically that she is at home. In (120) the speaker is stating that his/her mother is generally at home, though she may not be home specifically at the time of speech. That is, while she may be off shopping, she is not out of town on a trip. In these two examples the epistemics are used in an unmarked manner. In (121), however, the speaker uses the PERSONAL FACT epistemic to talk about another person, and is licensed to do so because this is a person about whom s/he has intimate knowledge; i.e., the speaker has a connection with the subject.

(119) *locative, unmarked*

ŋye: āma naŋ=la **duk**
 1.SG.GEN mother home=LOC CP,ELPA
My mother is at home.

(120) *locative, unmarked*

ŋye: āma naŋ=la **yö re?**
 1.SG.GEN mother home=LOC SK,ELPA
My mother is at home.

(121) *locative, intimacy*

ŋye: āma naŋ=la yō?
1.SG.GEN mother home=LOC PF,ELPA
My mother is at home.

Similarly, by using *yō?* rather than *yō re?* in the following example, my consultant is suggesting that he has an intimate connection with the village of Jumla. When a speaker takes the liberty of using the personal evidential in this way, s/he is indirectly making a claim of intimacy. In this case, Jumla is Karma's home village.

(122) *locative predicate (S&J,6)*

dzumla=te rishup nyī=ki kyī:=la yō?
Jumla=DEF mountain.valley two=GEN middle=LOC PF,ELPA
Jumla is between two mountain valleys.

Similar patterns are observed with possessive and attributive predicates, as illustrated by examples (123) through (126) below. Note that in (124) my consultant says the personal evidential is appropriate if Nima has the speaker's own money, but not if Nima is the speaker's relative. Thus the speaker has a connection with the predicate, but not with the subject. In (126), on the other hand, *yō?* is appropriate if the speaker has a connection with the subject but not the predicate. At this point, I am not clear on when a subject-connection licenses the personal evidential, and when the predicate-connection does.

(123) *possessive, unmarked (V/39, VI/49)*

nyima=la peSak duk / yō re?
[NAME]=DAT money CP,ELPA / SK,ELPA
Nima has money.

(124) *possessive, intimacy (9/6/00)*

nyima=la peSak yō?
[NAME]=DAT money SK,ELPA
Nima has (my) money.

(125) *attributive predicate; unmarked (9/6/00)*

ŋye: āma kyakpa duk / yō re?
1.SG.GEN mother fat CP,ELPA / SK,ELPA
My mother is fat.

(126) *attributive predicate; intimacy* (9/6/00)

ŋye: āma kyakpa yō?
1.SG.GEN mother fat PF,ELPA
My mother is fat.

6.1.2 With lexical verb predicates

The same effect can be achieved with lexical verb predicates. In (127) the speaker is conveying to the hearer that s/he sees a man eating across the room and in (128) the speaker is sure that the man is eating though s/he doesn't claim to have perceptual evidence to support this assertion. In (129) the speaker has intimate knowledge of the man's activity, because they are sitting together.

(127) *present tense, unmarked* (V/71,VIII/35)

khō sa-gi duk
3.SG.M eat-IMPF CP,AUX
He's eating.

(128) *present tense, unmarked* (V/71,VIII/35)

khō sa-gi yō re?
3.SG.M eat-IMPF SK,AUX
He's eating

(129) *intimacy* (VIII/35)

khō sa-gi yō?
3.SG.M eat-IMPF PF
He's eating.

My impression, at this time, is that with lexical verbs this effect of intimacy is acceptable only with the present tense. The personal evidential used in the past and future, recall, is *yīn*, which has an inherent sense of knowledge of volition. Since one cannot know about the intentions of others, *yīn* cannot, so far as I know, be used with non-1st person subjects with lexical verbs.

6.2 Creating an effect of distance

A speaker can create a sense of distance or lack of involvement in describing his/her own states or activities by using epistemics which are usually used to talk about non-1st person subjects. This is illustrated for the different predicate types below.

6.2.1 With predicate nominals and ELPA predicates

In the predicate nominal clause in (130) the CONSCIOUS PERSONAL FACT epistemic is used, as the speaker is making a statement about his/her own identity; the speaker is expressing a sense of self-acceptance. In (131), on the other hand, the speaker is objectively explaining to someone else that they are students.

(130) *predicate nominal; unmarked* (1/27/99)

ŋantso lōbTuk yin
 1.PL student CPF,COP
We are students.

(131) *predicate nominal; explanation* (1/27/99)

ŋantso lōbTuk reʔ
 1.PL student GF,LKV
We are students.

In describing his/her own attributes, the speaker would generally use *yōʔ*, making a factual statement; *duk* is used in (133) because the involved participants are standing in front of a mirror, examining their reflections.

(132) *1st person subject* (VI/50)

chōʔ le ŋa riŋ-a yōʔ
 2.SG than 1.SG long-COMP PF,ELPA
I am taller than you.

(133) *1st person subject* (VI/50)

chōʔ le ŋa riŋ-a duk
 2.SG than 1.SG long-COMP CP,ELPA
I am taller than you.

The following example illustrates distancing with non-1st person subjects. In the basic pattern *yō reʔ* would be used with a locative predicate. Here, though, the GENERIC FACT epistemic *reʔ* is selected. In context this is appropriate; this is the first line of a narrative, and the statement about the village's location functions as a factual introduction rather than as an assertion of location. This is similar to the use of *reʔ* in examples such as (131) above.

(134) *locative predicate* (S&J,1)

SimikoT (te) [[pö taŋ nepal] =ki kyi:] =la re?
 Shimikot (DEF) Tibet and Nepal =GEN middle =LOC GF
Shimikot is between Tibet and Nepal. (on the border?)

6.2.2 With lexical verb predicates

The speaker can create a sense of distancing him/herself from an act or event in which s/he is a participant by replacing the personal evidentials *yin*, *yö?*, or *tSuŋ* with a perceptual evidential (*duk*, *soŋ*) or with the non-evidential marker of certainty *re?*.

The following example is again from the story Karma's father and uncle told him about their encounter with an angry mother leopard. Karma explains to me that of course they did not have a gun with them because Tibetans do not hunt wild animals. Thus *re?* is used here with a 1st person subject because the speaker is making an objective factual statement.

(135) *Leopard Story* (VI/89)

ŋantso pö=pa tenzo cira-kyak-gi ma-re?
 1.PL Tibet=NOM DEM.PL hunt-VBLZR-IMPF NEG-GF,AUX
We Tibetans don't hunt.

The following three examples show decreasing levels of engagement in an event. In (136), the speaker is describing an accident which befell him/her. In (137), the speaker reports on the event as if s/he were standing outside him/herself and observing it. In (137) the speaker has distanced him/herself even further, not even claiming to have witnessed the event, but simply relating it in an objective way. All three have the same translation.

(136) *intimate involvement* (IV/45)

ŋantso ri: tSuŋ
 1.PL fall.PFTV HM,AUX
We fell.

(137) *outside observer* (IV/45)

ŋantso ri: soŋ
 1.PL fall.PFTV PP,AUX
We fell.

(138) *objective report* (IV/45)

ŋantso rj: reʔ
1.PL fall.PFTV GF,AUX
We fell.

The last two examples are relatively marked. Also marked, and asserting an even greater level of engagement, is the following, in which the speaker claims to have fallen intentionally.

(139) *intentional act* (IV/45)

ŋa rj: yin
1.SG fall.PFTV CPF,AUX
I fell.

A speaker can also manipulate the epistemic system to indicate a greater or lesser degree of engagement in discussing obligation. The use of *yöʔ* in (140) indicates that the speaker's obligation is internally-motivated, while the use of *reʔ* in (141) indicates that the speaker is impelled to act due to his/her responsibility to someone else. (My consultant also notes that there is a greater degree of certainty that the event will happen when *yöʔ* is used than when *reʔ* is used, though the reasoning behind this is not clear to me.) Note that the final epistemic can actually be omitted entirely here, in which case the sentence takes on the connotation of a promise to act.

(140) *internally-driven obligation* (III/9,III/79,VI/17)

ŋa tShōŋ-go (yöʔ)
1.SG jump-DEON (PF,AUX)
I have to jump.

(141) *externally-driven obligation* (III/9,III/79,VI/17)

ŋa tShōŋ-go (reʔ)
1.SG jump-DEON (GF,AUX)
I have to jump.

Thus the distribution of epistemics is governed by two parameters: epistemic modality / evidentiality, and engagement.

6.3 Similar systems in other dialects and languages

The manipulation of epistemic and evidential markers for pragmatic effect is not unique to Dokpa. Similar alternations have been described for other dialects of Tibetan, and for other languages.

In other dialects of Tibetan, the pattern of epistemic/evidential manipulation is similar to what I have observed in Dokpa, though different terminology has been used. In his work on Lhasa Tibetan, Agha (1993) uses the term “participant role perspective”, in which a speaker takes a personal or impersonal perspective on the proposition. Denwood (2000), also in reference to Lhasa, uses the term “viewpoint”. A speaker may express a ‘self-centered’ or ‘other-centered’ viewpoint, whether talking about him/herself or about others.

Häsler (forthcoming), in her discussion of the Dege dialect, refers to this parameter as “empathy”, which allows the speaker to express the degree to which s/he “sides with” the subject/Agent of an utterance. “Empathy” allows the speaker to choose an auxiliary based not only on evidential criteria, but also on deictic criteria, personal closeness or involvement of the speaker, and/or discourse backgrounding.

The Mongolic language Minhe Mangghuer has an evidential marking system which is similar in many – but not all – respects to that observed in Bodic languages. The similarities include manipulation of the evidentials for pragmatic effect in a manner very much like what I have described above. This pattern is referred to as a “subjective/objective speaker involvement system”, where “subjective marking indicates a high degree of personal involvement, while objective marking indicates a lesser degree of involvement, as though the speaker were standing back and presenting the event as a detached observer, rather than one who is personally involved” (Slater in progress, following Qinggeertai 1988 and Chen 1989).

Tsafiki, a Barbacoan language, has a conjunct-disjunct marking system similar to that observed in Tibetan, and which can be manipulated in a similar way. For instance, disjunct forms used with 1st person subject convey a sense of surprise (Dickenson ms).

In Kashaya, a Pomo language, a speaker referring to his/her own actions or states would normally select a Performative evidential suffix. However, if s/he wishes to step back from involvement, a Factual or Visual evidential would be used instead (Oswalt 1986:43).

In her typological review of evidential systems, Aikhenvald (forthcoming) discusses a number of languages in which evidentials normally used with non-1st person subjects take on different meanings when used with 1st person subjects. Such languages include Western Armenian, Kalasha, Hare, Khowar, Jaramara, Tsez, Meithei, Mandarin Chinese, and Wichita.

(p.69-72). Comparing such patterns with the type of epistemic manipulation observed in Tibetan would require further detailed study.

7. MARKERS OF INFERENCE

In section 5 I presented the morphologically simple epistemics, all of which indicate certainty, and thus are plotted in Box 2 of Figure 1. In this section I begin to consider the morphologically complex markers; these indicate lower degrees of certainty and are thus plotted outside of Box 2. I focus here on the epistemics marking inference, and then continue in section 8 to briefly illustrate other morphologically complex epistemics which mark possibility or probability.

My findings regarding the marking of inference in Dokpa are of particular interest for several reasons. First, I consider here the complete set of six markers of inference: *yin sā duk*, *yö sā duk*, *yin sā yö?*, *yö sā yö?*, *yin sā re?*, and *yö sā re?*. These have cognates in other Tibetan dialects, but have received little attention in the literature. The size of the set of inference markers is typologically unusual. The different markers allow the speaker to specify, if s/he chooses, the evidential basis for his/her inference. That is, some of Dokpa's inference markers are actually evidentials, while others are not, which is relatively rare cross-linguistically. A second interesting aspect of these markers is that, in the past tense, they can be used to indicate whether the speaker is making an inference about the subject of the clause or about the predicate of the clause. This, too, seems to be typologically anomalous. Finally, considering this full set of inference markers in Dokpa leads me to reconsider the morpheme *zhag* (/Saq/) which has previously been interpreted as an inference marker in Lhasa Tibetan (Delancey 1985, 1990; Bartee 1996). I suggest here that *zhag* is actually a marker of "deferred evidence", rather than inference.

In sections 7.1 through 7.4 below I discuss and illustrate Dokpa's six inference markers. In 7.5 I discuss the Lhasa Tibetan epistemic *zhag*, and in 7.6 I conclude with a comparison of the categories of inference identified in Dokpa Tibetan with categories defined in other languages.

Each of the morphologically complex epistemics of inference consists of two of the simple epistemics, plus an intervening non-epistemic element (the morpheme *sa*). The first

element of the inference markers must be either *yin* or *yō?* (or a lexical verb); no other epistemic can occupy the first slot. The final element must be either *duk*, *yō?*, or *re?*. Again, no other epistemic can occupy this slot. Though the structure of the inference markers is transparent, they are completely lexicalized units, as evidenced by the following points:

- The morpheme *sā* is semantically opaque; it has become part of the lexicalized whole.
- The sequence is phonologically unified, with a characteristic overall intonation contour. Furthermore, initial *yō?* is phonologically reduced to *yō*.
- In natural discourse, a speaker will pause before the entire complex, rather than in between two of its elements.
- The complex epistemics are part of a paradigm, occupying the same clause-final slot as the simple epistemics, as illustrated by the following examples.

(142) *simple epistemic* (V/71)

khō sa-gi **duk**
 3.SG.M eat-IMPF CP,AUX
He's eating.

(143) *complex epistemic* (V/71)

khō sa-gi **yō sā re?**
 he eat-IMPF INFR.UE,AUX
(I infer) He's eating.

Like the simple epistemics, the complex epistemics are not overtly translated.

In 7.1 below I explain what governs the speaker's selection of a form ending with *duk*, *yō?*, or *re?*, and in 7.2 through 7.4 I explain what governs the speaker's selection of a form beginning with *yin*, with *yō*, or with a lexical verb. As we will see, the syntactic distribution and pragmatic meaning of the six inference markers is based on the syntactic distribution and pragmatic meaning of their components.

7.1 The basis of inference

The final component of these complex epistemics indicates the basis of inference. Forms ending in *duk* indicate that the speaker's inference is drawn from perceptual data, just as the simple epistemic *duk* marks CURRENT PERCEPTION. Similarly, the forms ending in *yō?* indicate that the speaker's inference is drawn from some personal knowledge, just as the simple epistemic *yō?* marks PERSONAL FACT. Finally, just as the GENERIC FACT simple epistemic is appropriate

when the speaker cannot or does not choose to specify the source of his/her evidence, the complex epistemics ending in *re?* do not specify the basis of inference. This pattern is summarized below:


TABLE 3: INFERENCE MARKERS AND THE BASIS OF INFERENCE

perceptual evidence	personal evidence	unspecified evidence
<i>yin sa duk</i>	<i>yin sa yö?</i>	<i>yin sa re?</i>
<i>yö sa duk</i>	<i>yö sa yö?</i>	<i>yö sa re?</i>
V sa duk (?)	V sa yö? (?)	V sa re?

I therefore gloss *yin sa duk* and *yö sa duk* as INFR.CP, for “inference based on current perception”, *yin sa yö?* and *yö sa yö?* as INFR.PF, for “inference based on personal fact”, and *yin sa re?* and *yö sa re?* as INFR.UE, for “inference based on unspecified evidence”.

Interestingly, then, Dokpa has markers of inference which are evidentials (the forms in *duk* and *yö?*) and other markers of inference which are not evidentials (the forms in *re?*). None of these inference markers indicate certainty. These cross-cutting epistemic and evidential relationships are reflected in the figure below, in which the inference markers are enclosed in a box with a double line. As shown, none of the inference markers indicate certainty; some of them are evidential and others are not.

FIGURE 2: INFERENCE MARKERS IN DOKPA'S EPISTEMIC SPACE



Examples illustrating the use of the inference markers with representative ELPA predicates are provided below. In (144) the simple epistemic marking SPEAKER KNOWLEDGE is used to indicate certainty about a friend's location, but without indicating the source of evidence (recall that *yö re?* is an epistemic of certainty, but not an evidential). In (145) the speaker is making an inference about the friend's whereabouts, again without specifying evidence (*yö sa re?* is an epistemic of inference, but not an evidential). (146) would be appropriate if the friend's car is parked out in front of the house; the speaker is then inferring that the friend is at home and specifies that this inference is based on current perceptual evidence. Thus *yö sa duk* is an evidential. An existential is given in (147).

- (144) *locative, simple epistemic (V/94)*
 khō̄ n̄aŋ=la yō̄ re?
 3.SG.M home=LOC SK,ELPA
He's at home.
- (145) *locative, complex epistemic (V/94)*
 khō̄ n̄aŋ=la yō̄ s̄a re? / * yin s̄a re?
 3.SG.M home=LOC INFR.UE,ELPA
 [I infer] *He's at home.*
- (146) *locative, complex epistemic (V/94)*
 khō̄ n̄aŋ=la yō̄ s̄a duk
 3.SG.M home=LOC INFR.CP,ELPA
 [I infer] *He's at home.*
- (147) *existential (VIII/6//8/00)*
 paglep yō̄ s̄a re?
 bread INFR.UE,ELPA
 [I infer] *There is bread.*

Examples (148) through (151) show the use of inference markers with a lexical verb in the present tense. Both (148) and (149) use evidential markers of certainty. In (148) the speaker is witnessing his/her friend eating, and in (149) the speaker can claim that the friend is eating since they are in the same room or are eating together. In (150), the speaker infers that the friend is eating but doesn't elaborate on how s/he came to this conclusion, while in (151) the speaker specifies that the inference is based on some personal insider knowledge. This would be appropriate if the speaker had seen or talked to his/her friend previously and had some idea what his/her plans were.

- (148) *present tense, simple epistemic (V/71)*
 khō̄ sa-gi duk
 3.SG.M eat-IMPF CP,AUX
He's eating.
- (149) *present tense, simple epistemic (VIII/35)*
 khō̄ sa-gi yō?
 3.SG.M eat-IMPF PF,AUX
He's eating.

(150) *present tense, inference* (V/71)

khō sa-gi yō s̄ re?
he eat-IMPF INFR.UE,AUX
[I think or guess] He's eating.

(151) *present tense, inference* (VIII/6/11)

khō sa-gi yō s̄ yō?
he eat-IMPF INFR.PF,AUX
[I think or guess] He's eating.

7.2 Syntactic distribution

As is apparent from Table 3, the inference markers all begin with either *yin*, *yō*, or a lexical verb. What governs speaker selection of one form rather than another? For predicate nominals, ELPA predicates, and present tense lexical verbs, the distribution is syntactically controlled. That is, if the speaker is making an inference about a proposition in which the predicate is a nominal, then *yin s̄ duk*, *yin s̄ yō?*, or *yin s̄ re?* would be appropriate, and if the predicate is an existential, locative, possessive, or attributive, then *yō s̄ duk*, *yō s̄ yō?*, or *yō s̄ re?* would be used. (Henceforth I will use *yin s̄ re?* as representative also of *yin s̄ duk* and *yin s̄ yō?*, and *yō s̄ re?* as representative also of *yō s̄ duk* and *yō s̄ yō?*). This is consistent with the distribution of the simple epistemics *yin* and *yō?* described in section 5.¹⁹ Goldstein and Nornang (1970:35) also note this pattern, though for complex epistemics of possibility and probability; they do not address markers of inference.

It must be noted, though, that *yin s̄ re?* is used not only when the subject is the speaker, as was the case for the simple epistemic *yin* in the basic pattern, but also when the subject is 2nd or 3rd person. In (152) below, *yin* is used with 1st person subject, and in (153) *re?* is used with 3rd person subject, as expected in the basic pattern. However, in (154) the inference markers is *yin s̄ re?* with the same subject 3rd person subject. (There is no marker **re s̄ re?*)

¹⁹ I do not know, at this point, if the complex epistemics beginning with *yin* and *yō* can be manipulated for pragmatic purposes just as the simple epistemics *yin* and *yō?* can.

(152) *predicate nominal, 1st person subject (V/50):*

ŋa lōbTuk yin
 1.SG student CPF,COP
I am a student.

(153) *predicate nominal, 3rd person subject (VIII/6/11)*

te paglep re?
 that bread GF,LKV
That is bread.

(154) *predicate nominal, inference (VIII/6/8)*

paglep yin s̄a re? / *yō s̄a re?
 bread INFR.UE,COP
 [infer] *That is bread.*

This is actually parallel to what we observe in dependent clauses in Tibetan, as illustrated by (155). Alternations such as that between *re?* and *yin* in (153) and (155) have been described previously for Lhasa Tibetan by Chang and Chang (1984) and explored more recently by Garrett (1999; in progress).

(155) *nominalized clause (VIII/6/11)*

[page te paglep yin] =pa ŋe: hako-gi yō?
 DEM DEF bread COP²⁰ =NOM 1.SG.ERG know-IMPF PF,AUX
I know that is bread.

The parallelism between dependent clauses and the morphologically complex inference markers suggests that the latter may have originated by grammaticization and lexicalization across a clause boundary in a complex sentence. At this point I can only hypothesize that the mystery morpheme *s̄a* may be derived from a lexical verb, such as WT *sam* ‘to think’, WT *zer* (*/sal/*) ‘to say’, WT *bzo* (*/sol/*) ‘to make’ (Tournadre and Jiatso 1995; Das 1970 [1902]), or *tshō kyap* ‘to guess’. Another possibility is derivation from the place nominalizer *sa*; Beyer (1992:301) suggests that this *sa* was used as a marker of possibility in Classical Tibetan.

We now turn to inference about propositions in which the predicate is a lexical verb. When the verb is in the present tense, the marker *yō s̄a re?* is used after the verb stem and its imperfective suffix *gi*. In (156) below the subject is the speaker, so the PERSONAL FACT evidential

yō? is appropriate. With a 3rd person subject the CURRENT PERCEPTION evidential *duk* is used, as in (157). In a dependent clause, however, *yō?* is used instead of *duk* with a 3rd person subject, as in (158), just as we saw above. Correspondingly, the complex epistemic of inference which is appropriate is *yō s̄a rē?*, as seen in (159).

(156) *1st person subject (9/6/00)*

ŋa yige Tj-gi yō?
 1.SG letter write-IMPF PF,AUX
I'm writing a letter.

(157) *3rd person subject*

khō yige Tj-gi duk
 3.SG.M letter write-IMPF CP,AUX
He is writing a letter.

(158) *nominalized clause*

[khō yige Tj-gi yō] =pa ŋe hako-gi yō?
 3.SG.M letter write-IMPF AUX =NOM 1.SG know-IMPF PF,AUX
I know he is writing a letter.

(159) *complex epistemic (9/6/00)*

khō yige Tj-gi yō s̄a rē? / * yin s̄a rē?
 he letter write-IMPF INFR.UE,AUX
[I infer] He's writing a letter.

Note that a form with initial *yin* cannot be used in (159). When it follows the imperfective suffix *gi*, the simple epistemic *yin* indicates future tense, as we saw above in section 5, and a future tense reading is not acceptable here. Instead, when the speaker wishes to express an inference about a future event, the lexical verb is followed directly by *s̄a rē?* (or *s̄a duk* or *s̄a yō?*), as in (160), where the horse is nosing in the grassing, sniffing at it, and appears about to eat it.

(160) *future inference; epistemic modal (VIII/55)*

t'ā=gi ts'ā sa s̄a rē?
 horse=ERG grass eat INFR GF
[I infer] The horse is going to eat the grass.

²⁰ In my view, the *yin* in the embedded clause has its historic function as a linking verb here, and does not have epistemic force. Hence I gloss *yin* here as COP, rather than as CPF,COP. For further discussion of this point, see Garret (forthcoming).

This structure is similar to that in (161); in (160) the epistemic modal *sā* occurs in the slot occupied by the deontic modal *gō* in (161). While *gō* is clearly related to the lexical verbs *khō* ‘want’ and *gō* ‘be necessary’, the meaning of *sā* is opaque, indicating that it is at a more advanced stage of lexicalization. At this point I am not sure whether these modals are suffixes or independent morphemes.

(161) *deontic modal* (VIII/6/11)

t'ā ts'ā sa gō re?
 horse grass eat DEON GF
The horse has to eat the grass.

7.3 The locus of inference

The examples with lexical verbs above all described present or future tense events. In the past tense, in some examples, another typologically unusual contrast becomes apparent. Here, the speaker can freely choose between a *yin* form and a *yō* form; e.g., between *yin sā re?* and *yō sā re?* Though *yō* forms may have a perfect aspect reading, what is more interesting is that *yin* forms indicate that the speaker is making an inference about the subject of the clause, and *yō* forms indicate that the speaker is making an inference about the predicate of the clause.

The context of the following examples is that the speaker’s friend Pasang has said that he will go to buy some rice. In (162), the speaker sees the rice on the table and infers that Pasang is the one who bought it, since Pasang said he would. There is no question that the rice has been bought, as it can be seen on the table; what is of doubt is who bought it. I use underlining to reflect the subject focus of inference. In (163), the speaker sees Pasang coming from the market with his bags. S/he doesn’t know for sure what is in the bag, but infers that Pasang has bought rice, since he said he would. Here there is no question about the subject, and it is the action which is in doubt. (Note that here the direct object cannot be distinguished from the verb as the locus of inference. Word order variations would be required to focus on the object alone.) An appropriate context for (164) would be if the speaker had “insider knowledge” about Pasang’s probable activities; for instance, if the speaker had given Pasang instructions to buy rice or had seen Pasang at the rice stall at the market.

(162) *subject focus*(VIII/9)

Pāsaŋ=gi Dē: nyö: **yīn s̄a rē?**
 Pasang=ERG rice buy.PFTV INFR.UE,AUX
 (I infer) Pasang bought the rice.

(163) *predicate focus*(VIII/9)

Pāsaŋ=gi Dē: nyö: **yö s̄a rē?**
 Pasang=ERG rice buy.PFTV INFR.UE,AUX
 (I infer) Pasang bought the rice / has bought the rice.

(164) *predicate focus*(VIII/25)

khō Dē: nyö: **yö s̄a yö?**
 3.SG.M.ERG rice buy.PFTV INFR.PF,AUX
 (I infer) Pasang bought the rice / has bought the rice.

There is a subtle parallelism between the subject focus of the complex epistemic *yīn s̄a rē?* and the COP linking function of the simple epistemic *yīn*. Likewise, there is a parallelism between the predicate focus of the complex epistemic *yö s̄a rē?* and the ELPA linking function of the simple epistemic *yö?* These correlations are summarized below.

TABLE 4: CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN FOCUS AND LINKING FUNCTION

Focusing function		Linking function	
<i>yīn s̄a rē?</i>	subject focus	<i>yīn</i>	COP
<i>yö s̄a rē?</i>	predicate focus	<i>yö?</i>	ELPA

We have seen in previous sections that *yīn* suggests a degree of self-acceptance and identity (a type of subject focus?), and *yö?* emphasizes outward appearance (a form of predicate focus?). This topic warrants further consideration.

7.4 Other pragmatic parameters

This focusing function does not account for all of the alternations between complex epistemics beginning with *yīn* vs. *yö* in the past tense. The following examples would be appropriate in response to the question “where’s Pasang?” The speaker would say (165) if s/he had witnessed Pasang’s departure, and (166) s/he did not witness it, but were making an inference. Note that here a *yīn* form is used, although the subject is known.

(165) *certainty* (VIII/11)

khō pü? soŋ
3.SG.M depart PP,AUX
He left.

(166) *inference* (VIII/11)

khō pü? yin sā re?
3.SG.M depart INFR.UE,AUX
(I infer) He left.

I have two hypotheses here; perhaps *yin* is used because (a) the action is perfective; if it had some temporal relevance than perhaps *yō* would have been more appropriate; or (b) there is no way for the speaker to visually verify this completed event; if there were, again, a *yō* form might have been used.

Still other pragmatic parameters seem to govern the distribution of the complex epistemics of possibility and probability which are discussed in section 8 below.

7.5 Lhasa Tibetan *zhag*

In his work on Lhasa Tibetan, Delancey (1985, 1990) refers to the WT morpheme *zhag* (pronounced /Sa(q)/ as an evidential which marks inference, as illustrated in (168) and (169) (presented in Delancey's transcription).²¹

(167) *Lhasa*; Delancey 1985(8)

k'yerəŋ ril soŋ
you fall PERF/EVIDENTIAL
You fell down. (I saw it.)

²¹ Note that in the same papers Delancey considers forms with *ba-red* to mark inference as well, an analysis which is unique among work on Tibetan and other dialects:

Lhasa (Delancey 1985(10)) k'yerəŋ ril-ba-red
you fall-PERF/INFERENCE
You fell down. (So I infer.)

In 1985 he was not able to explicate what he saw as a semantic distinction between *zhag* and *ba-red*; in 1990 he interpreted *red* as a marker of indirect evidence, indicating report or inference. Where Lhasa uses *ba-red*, Dokpa uses *re?*, which is the GENERIC FACT marker of certainty. As shown above, *re?* can be used when the speaker cannot or does not choose to be specific about his/her knowledge source; it is semantically the most neutral epistemic. This same interpretation works as well for Lhasa *red*.

(168) *Lhasa*; Delancey 1985(9)

k'yerəŋ ril bśag
you fall PERF/INFERENTIAL
You fell down. (So I infer.)

(169) *Lhasa*; Delancey 1990(24)

khos dkaryol bcag-zhag
s/he cup broke-PERFECT/INFERENTIAL
S/he broke the cup.

(170) *Dokpa: perfect aspect*

chöŋ ri: duk
2.SG fall.PFTV CP,AUX
You fell down.

Per Delancey, *zhag* “marks a clause as a report of an event whose occurrence the speaker infers from present traces” (1990:299). Where *Lhasa* uses *zhag* *Dokpa* uses *duk*, as in (170), indicating that the speaker has current perceptual evidence of a completed activity. Both dialects allow a perfect reading for these sentences (as discussed for *Dokpa*’s *duk* in section 5 above).

Meanwhile, *Lhasa Tibetan* also has the full suite of six inference markers described here for *Dokpa* (Garret, personal communication June 2000). Since Delancey does not consider the complex epistemics in his work, he has not been obliged to draw a comparison between *zhag* and the complex forms with *sa*, as I am here. It is quite clear from my consultant’s explanations and contexts that the *sā* forms truly indicate that the speaker is going through the mental processes involved in making an inference. This is illustrated by a scenario in which A comments to B_i that the B_i’s brother_j is taller than B_i (171). B_i then responds that his/her_j father_k is taller than the brother_j (172), leading A to comment that the father_k must therefore be taller than B_i too (173).

(171) *A speaking to B (2/3/99)*

chö=gi tSöd3ö chö=le riŋan yö re?
2.SG=GEN older.brother 2.SG=than taller SK,ELPA
Your older brother is taller than you.

(172) *B’s response (2/3/99)*

ŋye: āpa (ŋye:) tSöd3ö=le riŋan yö re?
1.SG.GEN father (1.SG.GEN) older.brother=than taller SK,ELPA
My father is taller than my older brother.

(173) *A's inference* (2/3/99)

āpa yaŋ chō̄=le riŋan yō̄ sā rē?
father also 2.SG=than taller INFR.UE,COP
Oh, so (I infer) your father is also taller than you.

That *zhag* marks inference is not so clear, and seems to be Delancey's own interpretation. While it is true that a speaker must mentally draw an inference in order to make a statement such as (169) or (170), I do not believe that *zhag* functions to inform the hearer of this cognitive process. That is, inference is not the linguistic value of *zhag*; this morpheme does not serve to indicate inference.

I think it is preferable to consider *zhag* a marker of “deferred evidence”, following de Reuse's work on Western Apache (de Reuse 2000). In the San Carlos dialect, on which de Reuse focuses, the deferred evidence marker *lék'eh* is used when “the speaker did not have evidence for the event at the time that it occurred, but the speaker gained evidence for it at a later time”. In (174), for instance, the speaker didn't see the collision s/he refers to, but saw the result. Similarly, the context for (175) is that a family set up their campsite in the dark, not knowing where they were, and hit the trail again before daybreak. When they looked back on their campsite in the light, they realized it was a graveyard.

(174) *Western Apache* (de Reuse 2000:(6):[1])

Nt`é shih nabil lizgohi lék'eh
There had been a car accident / collision.

(175) *Western Apache* (de Reuse 2000:(5):[4])

Áí n`íi nanezna` leshijeedyú nohwiheskaa lék'eh
We had slept in a graveyard!

lék'eh has other extended uses, but what is relevant here is the concept of “deferred evidence” as an epistemic/evidential category. This interpretation accounts for the use of *zhag* and *duk* in (169) and (170) above. The epistemic difference between *duk* and *zhag* vs the complex forms with *sā* is that the former indicate certainty while the latter do not. When a speaker indicates inference with a *sā* form in either Lhasa or Dokpa, s/he is not absolutely certain about the proposition. There is a possibility that his/her claim is incorrect. The cognitive difference is that *duk* and *zhag* do not index a mental process of inference, while the *sā* forms do.

In conclusion, then, consideration of the markers of inference in Tibetan mandates reanalysis of Lhasa’s *zhag* as a marker of deferred evidence. The six morphologically complex epistemics I describe in this section are the true markers of inference in Tibetan. *zhag* is not used in Dokpa, and the notion is adequately captured by the use of *duk* following a perfective verb stem. If I were mapping the epistemic space of Lhasa I would place *zhag* in **b. perceptual evidentials** of Figures 1 and 2, along with *duk* and *soŋ*.

Note that correlates of WT ‘*dug* can similarly have a deferred evidence reading in other dialects of Tibetan. Volkart (forthcoming) discusses correlates of ‘*dug* in Kagate, Southern Mustang, Jirel, Lhomi, and Sherpa. She likewise observes that inference based on perception is implicit in most uses of ‘*dug* in the perfect aspect. However, she interprets ‘*dug* as non-evidential in this usage, and suggests that an inferential meaning in the perfect is derived from a historical resultative meaning. I think the perfect use of ‘*dug* as a marker of deferred evidence can just as well be accounted for as a natural extension of its use in the imperfective as a marker of current perception, as I propose here.

7.6 Inference in other dialects and languages

Morphologically complex markers of inference have received little attention in the literature on other Tibetan dialects. One exception is the work of Hein, who provides a glimpse of the three markers identified in the Tabo/Spiti dialect. Hein suggests that these forms, presented below, may be derived structurally from cognates of WT *pa* (which links verbal nouns) and the epistemic *yin*, together with the simple epistemics in this dialect.

TABLE 4: INFERENCE MARKERS IN THE TABO/SPITI DIALECT

Basis of inference	Form
action inferred from visual perception	-(w) <i>anuk</i>
action inferred from non-visual perception	-(w) <i>anak</i>
action inferred from speaker’s unspecified knowledge	-(w) <i>a jinkak</i>

Bielmeier (forthcoming) provides examples illustrating the “indirect inferential form” *in-ok* in Central and Nurla Ladakhi, which can be used with 1st- as well as non-1st person subjects to refer to “objective non-definite knowledge, based on inference”. Without knowing the context of the examples, though, it is difficult to determine if Bielmeier’s “inference” marker is a true linguistic encoding of the cognitive process of inferring.

Aikhenvald (forthcoming) describes complex systems of inference markers in a number of languages. The Nambiquara languages of Amazonia (after Lowe 1999:275-76) have two markers in the 'inferred and assumed' evidential category, which substantiate " 'the speaker's claim...based either on seeing an associated simultaneous action and making an interpretation therefrom, or on seeing a set of circumstances which must have resulted from a previous action and making an inference' ". Kashaya (Pomo; Oswalt 1986:34-35) has an 'inferential' *-q̃a* which " marks ' an inference based on circumstances or evidence found apart, in space or time, from the actual event or state' ". In Tsafiki (Barbacoan; Dickinson ms:27-29), the suffix *-nu* marks inference from direct physical evidence, while 'inference from general knowledge' is indicated by a nominalised verb plus a verb clas marker. Wichita (Caddoan: Rood 1996:589, 605) has "an inferential which can occur with three evidentiality subsystems: visual vs nonvisual; reported and 'conjecture'". "The so-called evidentials in Japanese include " ...three 'inferential' forms: *yoo da* is used when the speaker has some 'visible, tangible, or audible evidence collected through his own senses to make an inference..., *rasi-i* is used 'when the evidence is circumstantial or gathered through sources other than one's own senses, and *soo da* ... is used to talk about events which are imminent and when 'the speaker believes in what he is making an inference about'" (Aoki 1986:232). Thus we see that Dokpa is far from unique in having inference markers which are evidentials. [need to add these references]

One must be cautious, however, in considering the work of other linguists with respect to markers of inference. Some so-called inference markers may not actually index the mental process of inferring, but instead may be markers of deferred evidence in which the process of drawing an inference is necessary, but is not the linguistic meaning of the marker.

The category of deferred evidence may be substantiated in other languages. Per Jacobsen (1986:8), Washo has a marker expressing ex post facto inference. This perhaps should be re-evaluated as a potential marker of deferred evidence.

8. OTHER NON-CERTAINTY MARKERS

The markers of inference – unique in their overlap with evidentiality – are part of a much larger set of morphologically complex epistemics which indicate lower degrees of certainty. Here I briefly illustrate several other markers which indicate possibility or probability. Other

dialects of Tibetan have similar forms; again, the Dokpa forms presented here have direct correlates in Lhasa, with more or less the same phonological form and the same meaning. The inventory of complex epistemics in Lhasa is extensive, suggesting that Dokpa also likely has more forms than those I present here. There have been several efforts to rank these markers in a hierarchy of certainty or probability (e.g., Goldstein and Nornang 1970, Bartee in progress, Kretschmar 1986, Denwood 2000, Thonden 1984), but I do not attempt to do so.

The syntactic distribution of these forms follows the same pattern as the inference markers discussed above. That is, forms beginning with *yin* occur with predicate nominals, while those beginning with *yö?* occur with ELPA predicates. With lexical verbs in the present tense, *yö?* forms are used; in the past tense the speaker can choose either a *yin* form or a *yö?* form, with a possible subject vs predicate focusing function discussed above. There are also several pragmatic uses which I cannot yet interpret.

8.1 Markers of guessing

yin Do and *yö Do* are the complex epistemics which mark guessing. These are appropriate when the speaker is making a raw conjecture, without any basis to support his/her claim (a rare situation). I gloss both forms as GS, for GUESS. In (176), the speaker and a friend need to borrow money and are trying to think of whom they might borrow from. The speaker then suggests the hearer's brother as a possible source, even though s/he has no idea if the brother actually has money.

(176) *ELPA predicate* (VII/47)

khõ	tSod3o=la	peSak	yö Do
3.SG.GEN	brother=LOC	money	GS

Maybe your brother has money.

The context for the next three examples is, again, that the speaker's friend has promised to go buy some rice. In (177), the speaker is hoping or guessing that his/her friend has gone off to buy rice (as above, *yin* could not be used here because the clause is in the present tense). In (178) the speaker does not know if the shopping was completed and has no evidence from which to judge, but is hoping or guessing that it was. The subject is a given here and it is the predicate which is guessed at, which I emphasize by underlining in the free translation. In (179), the

speaker can see evidence that the purchase has been made, and is guessing that it was done by the person who had promised to do so, but is aware that it might have been done by someone else. That is, the predicate is a given and the subject is guessed at, as emphasized by underlining.

(177) *present tense* (VII/79)

khō nyō-gi yō Do
 3.SG.M.ERG buy-IMPF GS
He might be shopping/buying it.

(178) *guessed predicate* (VII/79)

khō nyō: yō Do
 3.SG.M.ERG buy.PFTV GS
He might have bought it.

(179) *guessed subject* (VII/79)

khō nyō: yin Do
 3.SG.M.ERG buy.PFTV GS
He might have bought it.

Examples of the GUESS epistemics suggest that other pragmatic parameters may also play a role the distribution of *yin* and *yō* forms. My consultant suggested that *yō* forms have a connotation of not only guessing, but also of hoping. The following examples describe a misfortune, a situation in which the speaker would not likely hope that his guess is accurate. Specifically, Pasang had money in his pocket earlier; now it is gone, and one of his friends asks another what happened. Indeed, my consultant says that (180) is a normal answer and (181) is odd, as the friend would not normally hope that the money was lost.

(180) *unmarked response* (VIII/21)

khō t'ōr **yin Do**
 3.SG.ERG lose **GS**
(I guess) He lost it. / He must have lost it.

(181) *marked response* (VIII/21)

khō t'ōr **yō Do**
 3.SG.ERG lose **GS**
(I guess/hope) He lost it.

In the following examples, the cat has gone missing and there is conjecture that it might have died. Both the *yin* and *yō* forms are pure guesses, and both could be used if the cat were known to be sick or old. The *yin* form, in (182), clearly does not have the subject as the focus of

guessing, as there is no doubt that all participants are discussing the same cat. Karma does not suggest that the *yō* form in (183) has a predicate focus. Instead, he says that this would be more appropriate if the speaker had perhaps given the cat poison and thus had some expectation (or hope?) that the cat would die.

(182) *pure guess* (VIII/15)

khō Si **yīn Do**
 3.SG.M die **GS**
I guess he died.

(183) *guess + expectation/hope* (VIII/15)

khō Si **yō Do**
 3.SG.M die **GS**
I guess he died.

The form with *yō* can also have a clear perfect reading, consistent with the occurrence of *yō?* as a simple epistemic:

(184) *perfect aspect* (VIII/15)

khō se: **yō Do**
 3.SG.M eat.PFTV **GS**
He might have eaten.

Finally, the *yīn* form may have a strong perfective sense, with the action fully completed in the past leaving no residual trace, while the *yō* form can suggest that the event could be visually verified by the hearer, if s/he were to go and look for the evidence. The following could both be said in answer to the question “Is Karma at home?”, but (186) would be more appropriate if Karma lived down the block (rather than in the same house as the speaker), and the hearer could then go check to see whether or not he’s at home.

(185) *perfective* (VIII/11)

khō tS̄i: **yīn Do**
 3.SG.M go.PFTV **GS**
(I guess) He left. / He must have left.

(186) *visually verifiable* (VIII/13)

khō tS̄i: **yō Do**
 3.SG.M go.PFTV **GS**
(I guess) He left. / He must have left.

It is difficult to isolate appropriate contexts to determine, with full confidence, the pragmatic distribution of the GUESS epistemics. Sheer guessing, with no evidence or inference, is probably somewhat rare in reality. This area demands the consideration of natural discourse data.

8.2 “I think...”

The complex epistemics which mean “I think (that)...” in Dokpa are *yin ci re?* and *yö ci re?* (WT *yin gyi red* and *yod kyi red*). These forms are among several which can be used to express possibility and probability. The distribution of *yin* forms and *yö* forms is as discussed above. Their diachronic origin is unclear; *gyi~kyi* may be derived from a subordinator, case marker, or perhaps an unidentified lexical verb. Example (187) is given in response to the question “what happened to your pen?”, where the speaker has an idea who the thief likely is. (188) is in response to the question “is Karma upstairs?”.

(187) *subject focus* (VIII/9)

khȫ=gi kũ: **yin ci re?**

3.SG.M=ERG steal.PFTV THNK

(I think) He stole it.

(188) *perfective aspect?* (VIII/11)

khȫ tʂi: **yin ci re?**

3.SG.M go.PFTV THNK

(I think) He left.

I have presented here only a sampling of the complex epistemics. There are other complex epistemics in Lhasa Tibetan which likely have correlates in Dokpa Tibetan, though I have not pursued them in my work to date. The set of markers of possibility and probability is thus greater than that discussed here; all of these markers are epistemics but not evidentials. It is only by considering these complex epistemics, together with the simple epistemics which have been the focus of much of the previous literature on Tibetan dialects, that the full picture emerges of the relationship between epistemics and evidentials.

9. CONCLUSIONS

In this paper I have presented an overview of the epistemic marking system of the Dokpa dialect of Tibetan. This system includes both morphologically simple markers of certainty and

morphologically complex markers of non-certainty. Evidentials comprise a subset of the epistemics, and span certainty and non-certainty.

Distribution of the morphologically simple markers is governed by their basic pragmatic meanings, and by the speaker's choice of expressing a greater or lesser degree of engagement in the action, event, or state described. Similar patterns have been observed in other dialects of Tibetan.

The morphologically complex epistemics express lower degrees of certainty, including markers of inference, guessing, and possibility or probability. The markers of inference are of particular interest, as some of them are evidentials and some are not. They also reveal a "focusing function" which allow the speaker to indicate whether the locus of inference is the subject of the clause or the predicate of the clause.

This study suggests several avenues for further research, such as a comparison of the epistemic/evidential categories proposed here to categories proposed for other Tibetan dialects and other languages. A careful examination of inference markers in descriptions of other languages is also called for to distinguish true markers of inference from markers of deferred evidence.

REFERENCES

- Agha, Asif. 1993. Structural form and utterance context in Lhasa Tibetan: grammar and indexicality in a non-configurational language. *Monographs in Linguistics and the Philosophy of Language*, Vol. 2. Simon Belasco, *General ed.* New York: Peter Lang.
- Aikhenvald, Alexandra. forthcoming. Evidentials.
- Anderson, Lloyd B. 1986. Evidentials, paths of change, and mental maps: typologically regular asymmetries. *in* Chafe and Nichols 1986: 273-312.
- Bartee, Ellen. 1996. Deixis and spatiotemporal relations in Lhasa Tibetan. University of Texas at Arlington MA thesis.
- Beyer, Stephan V. 1992. *The Classical Tibetan language*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Bielmeier, Roland. forthcoming. Syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic-epistemic functions of auxiliaries in Western Tibetan. *Linguistics of the Tibeto-Burman Area*.
- Bradley, David. 1997. Tibeto-Burman languages and classification. *in* *Pacific Linguistics A-86: Papers in Southeast Asian Linguistics No.14: Tibeto-Burman languages of the Himalayas*:1-72.
- Bybee, Joan L. 1985. *Morphology: a study of the relation between meaning and form*. *Typological Studies in Language* 9. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
- Chafe, Wallace. 1986. Evidentiality in English conversation and academic writing. *in* Chafe and Nichols 1986: 261-272.
- Chafe, Wallace and Johanna Nichols, *eds.* 1986. Evidentiality: the linguistic coding of epistemology. *in* Wallace Chafe and Johanna Nichols. *Advances in discourse processes*, V. 20. Norwood, N.J.: Ablex.
- Chang, Betty Shefts and Kun Chang. 1984. The certainty hierarchy among spoken Tibetan verbs of being. *Bulletin of the Institute of History and Philology*. Taipei: Academia Sinica.
- Chen, Naixiong. 1989. Verb forms of Wutun speech. *Minzu Yuwen* 6:26-37.
- Das, Sarat Chandra. 1970 [1902]. *A Tibetan-English dictionary with Sanskrit synonyms*. Delhi: Sundarlal Jain.
- de Haan, Ferdinand. 1999. Evidentiality and epistemic modality: setting boundaries. *Southwest Journal of Linguistics* 18(1):83-101.
- Delancey, Scott. 1984. Transitivity and ergative case in Lhasa Tibetan. *Proceedings of the 10th Annual Meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics Society*: 131-140. Berkeley: BLS
- Delancey, Scott. 1985. Lhasa Tibetan evidentials and the semantics of causation. *Proceedings of the 11th Annual Meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics Society*: ___-___. Berkeley: BLS.
- Delancey, Scott. 1986. Evidentiality and volitionality in Tibetan. *in* Chafe and Nichols 1986: 203-213.
- Delancey, Scott. 1990. Ergativity and the cognitive model of event structure in Lhasa Tibetan. *Cognitive Linguistics* 1-3: 289-321.
- Delancey, Scott. 1991. The origins of verb serialization in modern Tibetan. *Studies in Language* 15(1):1-23.

- Delancey, Scott. 1992. The historical status of the conjunct/disjunct pattern in Tibeto-Burman. *International Journal of Linguistics / Acta Linguistica Hafniensia* 25: 39-62.
- Delancey, Scott. 1985. Categories of non-volitional actor in Lhasa Tibetan. *in* The semantics of participant roles: South Asia and adjacent areas. H. Zide and D. Magier, *eds.* Bloomington: IULC.
- Denwood, Philip. 2000. Tibetan. London Oriental and African language library, Vol. 3. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
- de Reuse, Willem J. 2000. The "deferred evidence" particle in Western Apache. Presented at the 3rd Annual Workshop on American Indigenous Languages (WAIL), UCSB.
- Dickenson, Connie.
- Frajzyngier, Zygmunt. 1985. Truth and the compositionality principle: A reply to Palmer. *Studies in Language* 11:211-217.
- Garret, Edward. 1999. Embedded evidentials in Tibetan. UCLA unpublished ms.
- Goldstein, Melvyn C. and Nawang L. Nornang. 1970. Modern spoken Tibetan: Lhasa dialect. *Bibliotheca Himalayic, Series II, Vol. 14.* Kathmandu: Ratna Pustak Bhandar.
- Hale, Austin. 1980. Person markers: finite conjunct and disjunct verb forms in Newari. *Papers in South-East Asian linguistics* 7: 95106. R. Trail et al, *eds.* Canberra: Australian National University.
- Haller, Felix. forthcoming. The verbal categories of Shigatse Tibetan and Themchen Tibetan.
- Hargreaves, David J. 1991. The concept of intentional action in Kathmandu Newari. University of Oregon PhD dissertation.
- Häsler, Katrin. forthcoming. An empathy-based approach for the description of the verb system of the Dege dialect of Tibetan.
- Hein, Veronika. forthcoming. The role of the speaker in the verbal system of the Tibetan dialect of Tabo/Spiti.
- Huber, Brigitte. forthcoming. Preliminary report on evidential categories in Lende Tibetan (Kyirong).
- Jacobsen, William H. Jr. 1986. The heterogeneity of evidentials in Makah. *in* Chafe and Nichols 1986: 3-28.
- Kelly, Barbara. 1999. The status of speaker knowledge and volitionality in two dialects of Tibetan: Tokpa Tibetan and Sherpa. 5th Himalayan Languages Symposium, Kathmandu Nepal.
- Kretschmar, Monika. 1986. *Erzählungen und Dialekt der Drokpas aus Südwest-Tibet.* Sankt Augustin: VGH-Wissenschaftsverlag.
- Lyons, John. 1977. *Semantics II.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Matisoff, James A. 1978. Variational semantics in Tibeto-Burman: the "organic" approach to linguistic comparison. *Occasional papers of the Wolfenden Society on Tibeto-Burman linguistics* 6. Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues.
- Oswalt, Robert L. 1986. The evidential system of Kashaya. *in* Chafe and Nichols 1986: 29-45.
- Parks, Douglas R. 1976. *A grammar of Pawnee.* Garland studies in American Indian linguistics. New York: Garland.

- Payne, Thomas E. 1997. *Describing Morphosyntax: a guide for field linguists*. Cambridge University Press.
- Qinggeertai. 1988. *The Tu language and the Mongolian language*. Mongolian Language Family Dialects Research Series: Vol 13. Hohhot: The Inner Mongolian Peoples Press.
- Saxena, Anju. 1997. Aspect and evidential morphology in Standard Lhasa Tibetan: a diachronic study. *Cahiers de linguistique – Asie Orientale* 26(2): 281-306.
- Slater, Keith. 1998. *Minhe Mangghuer: a mixed language of the Inner Asian frontier*. University of California at Santa Barbara PhD dissertation.
- Sun, Jackson T.-S. 1993. Evidentials in Amdo Tibetan. *Bulletin of the Institute of History and Philology (BIHP)*. 63-4:945-1001. Taipei: Academia Sinica.
- Thonden, Losang. 1999 (1984). *Modern Tibetan Language, Volume I*. Dharamsala: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives.
- Tournadre, Nicolas. 1996. *L'érgativité en Tibétain. Approche morpho-syntaxique de la langue parlée*. Louvain/Paris: Peeters.
- Tournadre, Nicolas and Sangda Dorje. 1998. *Manuel de Tibétain Standard: langue et civilisation*. L'Asiathèque: Langues et Mondes.
- Tournadre, Nicolas and Khochok Jiatso. 1995. *Final auxiliary verbs in literary Tibetan and in the dialects*. Unpublished ms.
- Volkart, Marianne. forthcoming. *The meaning of the auxiliary morpheme 'dug in the context of the aspect systems of some Central Tibetan dialects: a comparison*.
- Willett, Thomas. 1988. A cross-linguistic survey of the grammaticalization of evidentiality. *Studies in Language* 12:51-97.
- Wylie, Turrell. 1959. A standard system of Tibetan transcription. *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 22:261-67.